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Abstract
Antitrust law is moving away from rules (ex ante, limited factor
liability determinants) and toward standards (ex post, multi-factor liability
determinants). This movement has important consequences for the
structure of antitrust adjudication, including shifting ultimate decisionmaking down the legal hierarchy (in the direction of juries, trial courts
sitting as fact-finders, and administrative agencies) and increasing the
importance of economic experts. The efficiency consequences of this trend
are often negative. Specifying liability determinants as open-ended,
unpredictable standards increases litigation costs, chills socially beneficial
industrial practices, allocates decision-making on microeconomic policy to
unqualified juries, and facilitates strategic misuse of antitrust litigation by
rent-seeking competitors. Instead of following a generalized preference for
standards, courts should consider five factors in choosing the ex ante
precision of liability determinants: (1) whether the lawsuit was brought by
the government or a private party; (2) whether the legal determinant would
create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is
prospective (i.e., injunctive) or retrospective (i.e., damages); (4) whether
the conduct is idiosyncratic or paradigmatic; and (5) whether the
misconduct alleged is collusion or exclusion. A standard-based approach is
most appropriate to create liability in public litigation seeking injunctive
relief against idiosyncratic practices. A rule-based approach is most
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appropriate when used to immunize archetypal forms of industrial behavior
from private actions for damages.

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law finds itself in the midst of a creeping transition from rules
to standards. Adjudicatory categories that have long held sway—such as
the dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason for
collaborative conduct or categorical rules of liability and immunity in
monopolization law—are progressively being replaced by open-ended
balancing of market values. As antitrust has become de-politicized and deideologized, flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist
conceptualism. Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play
the supporting cast to economists. Economic theory and post-hoc,
contextual examination of facts rather than a priori legal categories take
center stage in antitrust proceedings. Gone are the days when the Supreme
Court advocated stark antitrust rules and condemned “rambl[ing] through
the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.”1
The wilds are being tamed, and adjudicatory flexibility favored.
Why this transition? The Chicago School’s dramatic influence on
antitrust law since the mid-1970s accounts for a significant part of the story.
Economic theory has rehabilitated practices once condemned as per se
illegal because courts thought it a waste of time to see whether that conduct
might be justified by efficiency considerations.2 Full-blown review of the
context and motivation of practices once viewed as necessarily
anticompetitive often reveals that they are competitively benign.3 Yet the
* Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. B.A. Wheaton College; J.D. University of Chicago.
1
U.S. v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 569, 609 n.10 (1972).
2
See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 925 (1979); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 213 (1985). The Supreme Court has described its per se approach in antitrust
as “reflect[ing] broad generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry
into whether they apply to the case at hand would be needless and wasteful.”
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2002).
3
For example, vertical maximum resale price setting by upstream firms was once
condemned as per se unlawful. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). In
1997, the Supreme Court held that Albrecht had been mistaken and that the flexible
rule of reason should apply instead. State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997).
Since State Oil, plaintiffs appear to have had a hard time establishing that
maximum retail price setting has anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Mathias v.
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move toward greater adjudicatory flexibility—the move from rules to
standards—cannot be attributed solely to a less interventionist preference.
In recent years, the growing inclination toward fulsome review of the facts
has led a number of courts to reject bright-line rules that would have
immunized defendants from liability.
In monopolization cases, in
particular, prominent decisions have emphasized the need to consider the
fullness of the defendant’s conduct on a case-by-case basis, thus denying
defendants the sort of categorical legal rules most helpful for averting jury
trials.4 The move toward standards, it appears, has been motivated in part
by a sense that antitrust cases are too complex and socially important to
turn on simplistic legalist commands.
If history is a reliable teacher, the pendulum will eventually swing back
toward rules. Morris Cohen once noted that “periodic waves of reform
during which the sense of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and
flexibility into the law and makes it adjustable to its work” are often
followed by periods where “under the social demand for certainty, equity
gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules.”5 Similarly, Carol Rose has
documented a tendency in property law to “shift back and forth between
hard-edged, yes-or-no crystalline rules and discretion-laden, post hoc
muddy rules.”6 Whatever the perceived advantages of standards over rules
in antitrust, the disadvantages of standards will probably induce a countermovement back toward rules once the current movement has run its course.
This is not to say that a rules-standards-rules-standards cycle is
inevitable. Certain fields lend themselves primarily to rules (tax comes to
mind)7 and others lend themselves more to standards (constitutional law

Daily News, L.P., 152 F.Supp.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Similarly, the Supreme
Court once believed that tying could “serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 306 (1949), but subsequent learning has shown that tying has many
procompetitive purposes. David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms
Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying
Law, 22 Yale J. Reg. 37 (2005); Benjamin Klein, Tying, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, vol. 3, p. 630 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
4
See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
5
MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 261 (1933).
6
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 590
(1988).
7
See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 859 (1982).
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comes to mind, although less obviously).8 Other fields settle on a mixture
between rules and standards, thus preventing “crystals and mud” cycles.9
There is wisdom in seeking such balance. As Richard Posner has aptly
observed, “no sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to
standards, or vice versa.”10 Antitrust law is a good case in point. Neither a
completely rule-based nor standard-based juridical structure would
adequately promote competitive and efficient economic markets.
In this article, I argue against wholesale abandonment of rules in
antitrust, which appears to be where prevailing currents are taking us. Part
of my argument follows familiar lines from the “rules versus standards”
literature,11 such as the trade-offs between precision and predictability and

8

But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175 (1989).
9
See Rose, supra n. xxx.
10
MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
11
A litany of the leading generalist literature on the “rules versus standards”
question includes P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLE-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL
THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (primarily chapters one and two);
HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 155-58 (tent. ed.
1958); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987);
Anthony I. Ogus, Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds.,
1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990);
ROSCO POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48-71 (1922);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991); ROBERTO UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-100 (1975); ); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 22-29 (1967); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257
(1974); Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 256 (1995); Louis Kaplow, A Model of Optimal Complexity of Legal
Rules, 11 J. L. & Econ. Org. 150 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Russell B.
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79
Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different
Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 475, 482-87 (1933); Eric A. Posner, Standards,
Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 (1997); Pierre J. Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
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the costs of promulgating legal commands based on the frequency of the
regulated conduct. But antitrust has unique features—such as the treble
damages remedy, the close proximity of socially beneficial and harmful
behavior, and the propensity of competitors to misuse antitrust lawsuits for
strategic advantage—that require an expanded set of considerations when it
comes to the precision of liability determinants. Given the peculiarities of
antitrust, the optimal choice between rules and standards depends on a
variety of factors. I identify five such factors that should influence the
choice between rules and standards as to different types of industrial
behavior and different types of proceedings and parties. In rough order of
importance, they are: (1) whether the lawsuit was brought by the
government or a private party; (2) whether the legal determinant would
create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is
prospective (i.e., injunctive) or retrospective (i.e., damages); (4) whether
the conduct is idiosyncratic or paradigmatic; and (5) whether the
misconduct alleged is collusion or exclusion. A standard-based approach is
most appropriate to create liability in public litigation seeking injunctive
relief against an idiosyncratic practice. A rule-based approach is most
appropriate when used to immunize archetypal forms of industrial behavior
from private actions for damages.
Part I of this article summarizes the progression that antitrust law has
made and is making from a system mixing rules and standards to one in
which rules are increasing disfavored and standards favored. Part II asks
whether rules are really possible or whether even those legal commands
framed as rules inevitably dissolve into standards. It concludes that, in
antitrust at least, important consequences follow from the designation of
liability and adjudicative criteria as either rules or standards. Part III
considers the efficiency implications of antitrust rules and standards. It
argues for an approach sensitive to the nature of the plaintiff (i.e., public or
private) and the nature of the remedy sought (i.e., injunction or damages)
and to whether the legal expression would create or prevent liability.
Finally, Part IV considers some non-efficiency based criteria for choosing
between rules and standards, such ideologically oriented objections to either
rules or standards and the value of maintaining a short set of foundational
antitrust rules in order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust law and
orient the public toward the meaning of this often ill-understood enterprise.

Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 956-57 (1995).
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I. THE PROGRESSION FROM RULES TO STANDARDS
Antitrust law has never been, and could not be, an exclusively rulebased system.12 It governs too vast and complex an array of business
practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical rules. Yet rules—
specifications of liability criteria in formal, seemingly precise, and usually
short directives13—have made up a significant part of antitrust law for a
good bit of the Sherman Act’s interpretive history. In the not too distant
past, it was possible to describe much of antitrust law in categorical terms,
both in terms of what was categorically prohibited and what was
categorically allowed.
This is changing, although not primarily through Supreme Court
leadership. The Rehnquist court was largely uninterested in antitrust,
granting certiorari in few antitrust cases that raised issues of substance.14 In

12

Richard Epstein imagines the possibility of antitrust fitting within his preferred
paradigm of a few simple rules for a complex world. Epstein, supra note xxxx at
123-27. As discussed below in Section IV(A), however, what Epstein imagines is
not so much rule-based antitrust as much less antitrust.
13
I do not mean to try and add to the jurisprudential debate over what is a rule and
what is a standard. The general properties of liability criteria that are more rulelike (i.e., do not drive over 55 miles an hour; pay at a marginal rate of 33%; a
Senator must be 35 years old) and standards (i.e., good faith; negligence;
unconscionably; undue burden; proportionality) are fairly apparent, although as
with virtually any category, they tend to fray at the margins. See Duncan, supra n.
xxx at 1688.
14
During its 19 year, the Rehnquist Court decided only 11 cases involving issues of
substantive antitrust law. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); California Dental Association v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756 (1999); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997; Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447
(1993); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992);
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck,
496 U.S. 543 (1990); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411
(1990); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988). See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Business Power in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz, ed.
2002) (providing a critical analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s antitrust jurisprudence
and expressing relief that the Court did not take more antitrust cases). It remains to
be seen whether the Roberts court—led by a Chief Justice whose spent a good bit
of time in private practice on antitrust matters—will take a greater interest. For his
part, Justice Alito has signaled a low degree of interest in antitrust. See Hearing on
the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong.
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the few substantive antitrust cases it decided, the Rehnquist court
sometimes followed a rule-based approach, particularly with respect to
exclusionary practices where it seemed concerned about the deleterious
effects on incentives to compete of open-ended, unpredictable standards.15
But the Supreme Court simply has not decided enough antitrust cases in
recent years to permit a broad generalization about its direction. With the
Supreme Court rarely intervening, a movement away from rules and toward
standards has been carried out by the lower courts and antitrust enforcement
agencies, which have followed an impulse to manage antitrust adjudication
in a more multi-factor, fact-dependent, and ex post way than under the older
rule-based model.
A. Collusion
Any student of U.S. antitrust doctrine in the past half-century quickly
learned that restraints of trade fall into two categories—(1) those that are
per se illegal; and (2) those that require examination under the rule of
reason.16 The rule of reason is, for present purposes, a misnomer, since it is
theoretically at least more standard-like than rule-like.17 Under the classic
Chicago Board of Trade formulation,18 conduct falling within the rule of
reason must be examined under a wide range of criteria, including the
structure of the relevant industry, the justifications for the restraint, and its
effects on prices and output levels. On the other hand, conduct falling
within the per se rule is absolutely prohibited. Antitrust doctrine curtails
inquiry into the reasons for the conduct, the market power of the firm
engaging in the conduct, and the desirability of the conduct from a
consumer welfare perspective.19
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Topco20 represents the high
water mark of the absolutist nature of the per se rule. The defendants were
(2006) (Statement of Sen. Mike Dewine on Antitrust Issues), available at 2006 WL
53273.
15
See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
16
See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK §§ 5.3c-5.3f at 192-217 (2000).
17
I say “theoretically at least” because, as discussed below, the rule of reason often
resulted in fairly summary adjudication for the defendant. In Section I(A) below, I
consider the possibility that the rule of reason was once fairly rule-like in
application.
18
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
19
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
20
U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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small regional grocers that formed a buying cooperative to create a private
label brand—Topco—in order to compete more effectively with large
national grocery chains. In order to prevent free-riding on local-market
promotion of the Topco brand, the participating grocers agreed to a system
of exclusive territories.21 When the federal government challenged the
Topco exclusivity system as a per se illegal market division agreement, the
district court made a series of “dream” findings for an antitrust defendant:
Topco’s members had no market power; the exclusivity system was
supported by legitimate free-riding concerns; the exclusivity system would
strengthen the Topco grocers and make them more efficient competitors
with the large national grocery chains; and enjoining operation of the Topco
exclusivity system would actually diminish competition in the grocery
business because it would make the dominant national chains even more
dominant.22 As Justice Blackmun lamented in dissent, the effect of
enjoining the exclusivity system would be that “the bigs . . . should find it
easier to get bigger.”23
Without denying the validity of any of the district court’s findings,
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the
district court’s opinion approving the Topco exclusivity system. His
opinion dismisses the possibility of a balancing, post-hoc approach to
antitrust adjudication. The problems with such an approach include
institutional incompetence to engage in meaningful fact-specific balancing
(“The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems”),24 loss of ex ante predictability for the subjects of the
legal regime (“Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with
little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to
be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act”),25 and general distrust of
economic theory (“Should Congress ultimately determine that predictability

21

On the free-riding concerns that motivated the exclusivity system in Topco, see
Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev.
5, 70-71 (2004). But see Robert Pitofsky, Joint Venture Guidelines: Views from
One of the Drafters, Speech before ABA Antitrust Section Workshop: Joint
Ventures and Strategic Alliances: The New Federal Antitrust Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines 5 (Nov. 11, 1999) <http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/jvg991111.htm> (questioning whether Topco
exclusivity system was necessary to prevent free-riding).
22
United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033, 1040, 1042 (N.D. Ill.
1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23
Topco, 405 U.S. at 612
24
405 U.S. at 609.
25
Id. at 609 n.10.
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is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per se rules
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through
the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach”).26
Although the law of collaborative conduct was often presented as a
dualism between the rule of reason and the per se rule,27 there was actually
a third category that also appeared in rule-like form: per se legality. For
example, under the venerable Colgate doctrine,28 a manufacturer was free
to announce a suggested retail price (“MSRP”) and then refuse
prospectively to do business with any retailer that deviated from the MSRP.
Although it would not take any great stretch of legal reasoning or the
English language to imagine such conduct as an agreed-upon restraint of
trade,29 the Supreme Court (influenced by the property rights and freedom
of contract formalist ideology of the Lochner era)30 permitted such use of
MSRPs as an absolute right. But because setting of retail prices by
agreement was (and still is to some extent) per se illegal,31 a manufacturer
who deviated ever so slightly from the simple model of announcing an
MSRP and cutting off any cheating retailer would lose the Colgate
privilege and find itself within the per se rule.32 This doctrinal dualism
caused radical swings between the poles of per se legality and illegality
based on slight differences in the challenged conduct.33

26

Id.
See Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(describing traditional “dichotomous categorical approach” in Section 1 cases).
28
U.S. v. Colgate & Co., & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
29
Under traditional contract law doctrine, a unilateral contract is formed by a
promisee’s performance of a requested act. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
45 (1982). If a manufacturer announces an MSRP and a retailer acquiesces by
selling the product at that price, a unilateral contract has been formed in
conventional terms. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that an
invitation to collude followed by unspoken acquiescence meets the threshold
requirement of a “contract, combination, or conspiracy.” Interstate Circuit.
30
Edward P. Krugman, Soap, Cream of Wheat and Bakeries: The Intellectual
Origins of the Colgate Doctrine, 65 St. John’s L. Rev. 827 (1991).
31
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); c.f.
State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997).
32
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Albrecht v. Herald &
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
33
In Albrecht, for instance, the defendant’s only deviation from privileged exercise
of its Colgate rights was that it integrated forward into distribution and hired
another person to deliver newspapers on the terminated distributor’s old routes.
390 U.S. at 147-48.
27
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In recent years, there has been a marked transition away from rules and
toward standards in collaborative conduct cases. This occurred in an
obvious way beginning in the 1970s as the Burger and then Rehnquist
courts overruled Warren court precedents that had condemned a variety of
business agreements as per se illegal. As common business practices such
as vertical territorial allocations,34 maximum resale price setting,35
expulsions of members from industry associations,36 and a manufacturer’s
acquiescence in a retailer’s demand to terminate a competing retailer that
was deviating from the manufacturer’s MSRP37 went from the per se rule to
the rule of reason, the domain of rules shrunk and the domain of standards
grew. Significantly, the Court declined the Chicago School’s call to move
vertical restraints from per se illegality to per se legality. In State Oil,
Justice O’Connor—who is also fond of balancing tests in constitutional
law38—went out of her way to make clear that the Court was not holding
“that all vertical maximum price fixing is per se lawful.”39 Vertical
restraints would still require scrutiny, but under the multi-factored rule of
reason.
The transition from rules to standards did not take place solely due to a
juridical shift of particular business practices from one category to another.
Instead, the entire judicial rhetoric of antitrust has moved in a more
nuanced, standard-based direction over the past few decades. With few
exceptions,40 the courts have stopped creating new categories of per se
34

Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
35
See supra n. xxx.
36
Compare Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961) and Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
37
Compare Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) and
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). In
Sharp, the Court denied that it was overruling Klors, which it characterized as a
horizontal case because Broadway Hale had gotten its suppliers to agree among
themselves not to supply Klors. However, the horizontal aspects of the case were
certainly not stressed in Klors and the Sharp distinction has the effect of essentially
limiting Klors to its facts.
38
See Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 55 S. Ct. Rev. 231 (2003).
39
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 22; c.f. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981)
(arguing for per se legality for most vertical restraints).
40
Although the Supreme Court has not created a new per se illegal category in a
very long time, a lower court will occasionally stretch the bounds of the per se rule
to encompass a new practice. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896
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illegal conduct, even though commercial circumstances and practices
evolve over time and litigation frequently explores new areas of
commercial behavior. Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court seems to
have frozen the canon of per se illegal practices, without necessarily
pushing all other behavior into rule of reason. Instead, arguably beginning
with National Society of Professional Engineer v. FTC41 in 1978, the Court
adopted what came later to be known as the “Quick Look” approach. In
subsequent cases like NCAA v. Board of Regents42 and California Dental v.
FTC,43 the Court described the Quick Look approach as involving an initial
determination by the court, based on a “rudimentary understanding of
economics,” that the practice at issue has obvious anticompetitive effects,
which puts the defendant to the burden of immediately putting forth a
procompetitive justification for the practice.44
The quick look approach could be nothing more than an initial triaging
tool to decide whether the particular practice falls into the per se rule or the
rule of reason, but its effects on antitrust doctrine have been more
transformative. Although the Supreme Court has only hinted in this

(6th Cir. 2003) (holding per se illegal an agreement between a branded
pharmaceutical firm and a generic pharmaceutical firm that the generic firm would
not produce a drug allegedly infringing the branded firm’s patent during the
pendency of the infringement litigation); but see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation, 429 F.3d 370 (2005); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056
(2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003);
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (all evaluating such settlements under the rule of reason); see
generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements, in ISSUES
IN COMPETITION POLICY (Dale Collins, ed., forthcoming 2006).
41
National Society of Professional Engineers v. FTC, 435 U.S.679 (1978). In
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit
described Professional Engineers as the last of the dualist cases. But see text
accompanying notes xxx – xxx, describing later cases in which the Supreme Court
mechanically applied the per se rule.
42
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
43
California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
44
On the quick look, see Max R. Shulman, The Quick Look Rule of Reason:
Retreat from Binary Antitrust Analysis, 2 Sedona Conf. J. 89 (2001); Alan J.
Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule
of Reason, 68 Antitrust L. J. 461 (2000); Stephen Calkins, California Dental
Association: Not a Quick Look but not the Full Monty, 67 Antitrust L. J. 495
(2000); James A. Keyte, What Is It and How Is It Being Applied: The Quick Look
Rule of Reason, 11-SUM Antitrust 21 (1997); Kathleen E. McDermott, A Quick
Look at the “Quick Look,” 5-SPG Antitrust 32 (1991).
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direction,45 the Federal Trade Commission and some federal appellate
courts have explicitly read the quick look cases, in combination with the
“characterization” cases discussed in the next section, to have broken down
the entire dualistic structure of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In its recent
Polygram decision, the D.C. Circuit reported: “The Supreme Court’s
approach to evaluating a § 1 claim has gone through a transition over the
last twenty-five years, from a dichotomous categorical approach to a more
nuanced and case-specific inquiry.”46
Polygram was an appeal of a decision by the Federal Trade
Commission finding illegal an agreement between Polygram Records and
Warner Music with respect to the marketing of recordings of live concerns
by the famed “Three Tenors” (José Carreras, Placido Domingo, and
Luciano Pavarotti). Polygram had distribution rights to the original 1990
Three Tenors recording and Warner had rights to the second (1994) Three
Tenors recording.47 In 1998, the Three Tenors made a third recording and
Warner and Polygram agreed to distribute it jointly. Ostensibly so as to
avoid free-riding on their joint promotional activities, the distributors
agreed that they would each forgo promoting the earlier two albums for a
six-week period during which the 1998 album was going to be heavily
promoted.48
The Federal Trade Commission’s staff challenged the “moratorium”
agreement as anticompetitive,49 and the administrative law judge, the
45

See California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth
is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms
like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” tend to make them appear.”).
46
Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (2005).
47
Id. at 31.
48
Id. at 32.
49
Although the FTC challenged the practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act and
not Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the agency and the courts treated the analysis
under both statutes as identical. See 416 F.3d at 32 (observing that that the FTC
was correct in observing “that the analysis under § 5 of the FTC Act is the same in
this case as it would be under § 1 of the Sherman Act). This point is significant for
present purposes because the Supreme Court has ruled that the FTC may have more
prophylactic flexibility under the FTC Act than either the Department of Justice or
a private litigant would have under the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394395 (1953). However, the fact that both the FTC and the D.C. Circuit equated the
analysis under the two statutes and relied interchangeably on Supreme Court cases
involving the FTC and private litigants indicates that the approach to collaborative
conduct outlined in Polygram and similar FTC decisions is not limited to public
enforcement.
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Commission itself, and the D.C. Circuit all agreed that it was. Following
the rule-based system, the analysis could have been quite short. As the ALJ
found (and the Commission, at least, agreed), the agreement not to discount
the separate products marketed by the joint venturers outside the joint
venture was “simply a form of price fixing.”50 In conventional terms, that
would have meant per se condemnation, without considering the reasons for
the agreement, whether defendants had market power, whether there were
anticompetitive effects, and other rule of reason factors. Yet both the
Commission and the D.C. Circuit went out of their way to stress that they
were not evaluating the restraint in any fixed category, because fixed
categories are no longer in vogue. As the D.C. Circuit explained, it would
be mistaken to think of the quick look approach as merely a new antitrust
category—as though “the Court has moved from a dichotomy to a
trichotomy”51—when in fact the question is always “whether . . . the
challenged restraint enhances competition.”52
To put it that way is to take the law of collaborative restraints out of
rules and place it squarely into a flexible, post-hoc framework. Although a
reticulated burden-shifting framework remains in place,53 it is procedural
and flexible rather than substantive and rigid. Rather than specifying ex
ante rules of conduct, it allocates burdens of proof and persuasion within
the litigation: Step One: The judge or agency considers whether the
restraint obviously harms consumers; Step Two: If so, the judge or agency
concludes that the practice does presumptively harm consumers, the
defendant must come forward with a plausible and legally cognizable
efficiency justification; Step Three: If the defendant does, the burden shifts
back to the agency to address the justification, in one of two ways; and so
forth.54 This approach captures the values of a standard (flexibility, ex post
policy-making, fact-specificity, object-dependence) and eschews the values
of a rule (predictability, ex ante policy-making, category generality,
subject-dependence).
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will ultimately accept
that its precedents signaled an end to doctrinal dichotomy, trichotomy, or
any other discrete categorization and an opening to the incremental

50

In re Polygram Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765, at * xxx
(FTC July 24, 2003).
51
416 F.3d at 35.
52
Id. (citing California Dental, 536 U.S. at 779-80).
53
The FTC traces this approach back to its decision in In re Massachusetts Bd. of
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
54
416 F.3d at 35-36.
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continualism adopted by the Polygram court.55 However, signs abound that
the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from both of its
rule-bound poles—per se legality and per se illegality—toward a flexible
center. Not only are practices like the no-discounting agreement in
Polygram that once would have been condemned as per se illegal now
adjudged under a more nuanced standard, but practices that might have
been rubber-stamped as acceptable under older rule of reason jurisprudence
are receiving a more thorough investigation under a reinvigorated rule of
reason.
At the outset of this section, I said that the rule of reason was
“theoretically at least” a more fact-intensive, multi-factor approach than the
per se rule. The caveat was necessary because many scholars believe that
categorization of a practice into the rule of reason once meant virtual per se
legality. During the earlier years of the Chicago revolution, Richard Posner
offered that “the content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in
practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability,”56 and during its
55

The Court will have a further opportunity to reveal its direction when it rules in
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, U.S. N. 04-814, which concerns the question of whether a
joint venture that unifies its marketing and production functions but continues to
sell separately through its joint venturers and sets a uniform price for the individual
joint venturer’s sales has committed a per se illegal price-fix.
56
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1977). More recent
assessments along the same lines include Mark E. Roszkowski, State Oil Company
v. Khan and the Rule of Reason: The End of Intrabrand Competition? 66 Antitrust
L.J. 613, 638 (1998) (“There is no justifiable reason for the rule of reason to be the
‘defendant always wins’ non-standard sanctioned by the Chicago School.”);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 685 (1991) (“The rule of reason and per
se approaches have been so divergent that a court’s choice of one analysis over the
other will usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case. Traditionally, the rule
of reason has meant a decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for
the plaintiff.”); Deborah A. Widiss, Uneasy Labeling, 107 Yale L.J. 1529, 1529
(1998) (“In theory, rule-of-reason analysis requires a careful examination of the
competitive impact of a specific agreement; in practice, however, the challenged
agreement is rarely struck down.”); Joe Sims, Developments in Agreements Among
Competitors, 58 Antitrust L.J. 433, 435 (1989) (”If it was per se illegal the
plaintiffs won; if it was rule of reason the defendants won; and all you had to do
was put it in the right box. For those who like bright-line rules, this was perfect.”);
Albert A. Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 St. Louis U. L.J.
331, 337-38 (1983) (“With only slight exaggeration, there is really only one thing
one needs to know about the rule of reason: when the rule is applied, the defendant
virtually always wins.”); see also, Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1059
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later years Frank Easterbrook offered that adjudication under the rule of
reason meant “as a practical matter meant that [the challenged practices]
were declared lawful per se.”57 This may have been a bit of an
overstatement, since, focusing even on just the Supreme Court precedents,
defendants have lost some significant rule of reason cases.58 Still, the
assessment that rule of reason often came close to a rule of per se legality
was not far off the mark, especially in cases involving vertical restraints.59
In recent years, even as the per se rule has moved toward a more
flexible balancing approach, the rule of reason seems to have become
reinvigorated. Important cases like Visa60 have found business practices to
be in violation of the rule of reason, resulting in billions of dollars of
payments to consumers and sometimes radical restructuring of industry
practices. Some lesser known decisions have also held that particular
business practices failed the rule of reason.61 At the same time, the
venerable Colgate rule categorically privileging firms to announce in
advance the criteria they will use to choose upstream or downstream
business partners appears to be gradually dissolving into a more flexible
middle ground between per se legality and per se illegality. Judicial
decisions have found ways to narrow the Colgate “right” without casting
the conduct into the opposite pole of per se illegality.62
(2d. Cir. 1996), decision vacated Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998
(”[T]he initial categorization is often outcome determinative.”).
57
Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 Geo. L.J.
305, 305 (1987).
58
United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945),
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
59
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the
Rule of Reason, 60 Antitrust L. J. 67, 71 (1992) (reporting that defendants have
won over 90% of rule of reason decisions in vertical nonprice cases since Sylvania)
60
U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). In the settlement to the
private lawsuits following the Justice Department action, Visa settled for $2 billion
and Mastercard for $1 billion. See Lawyers Seek $609 Million Fee for Negotiating
Deal for Retailers with Visa and Mastercard, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2003, at C4.
61
See Telecor Com’n, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,305 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir.
2002); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); Law v. Nat.
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Harolds Stores, Inc. v.
Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996).
62
See, e.g., Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d
1008, 1013 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that manufacturer’s refusal to do business with
service provider was “per se legal, because a ‘manufacturer has a right to select its
customers and refuse to sell its goods to anyone, for reasons sufficient to itself,’ ”
but then holding that the service provider “is required to establish the
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In sum, the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from
both of its poles—per se legality and per se illegality—into a broad middle
ground where nothing is prejudged and everything is negotiable in
litigation.
B. Exclusion
It is more difficult to tell a strong “before and after” rules versus
standards story with respect to exclusionary practices than it is with respect
to the law of voluntary restraints. Monopolization law has always been
more flexible and fact-sensitive. This is partly because Section 1 of the
Sherman Act gives a clear target for adjudication—a “contract,
combination, or conspiracy” that, juridically, must be the subject of the
court’s inquiry. Section 2, by contrast, contains no clear target since all of a
firm’s amorphous conduct may be relevant to answering the question
whether it unlawfully monopolized. A strenuous debate is presently stirring
in antitrust circles about how to conceptualize the monopolization offense.63
After over a century of Sherman Act development, we still are not clear on
the organizing principles of exclusionary practices law.
Yet it is not difficult to locate a variety of actual or potential rules, both
imposing liability and immunizing against it, in the arena of exclusionary
practices. Examples include: (1) no above-cost price can be called
predatory;64 (2) pricing below cost is conclusively presumed predatory;65
(3) patents are presumed to confer market power and requiring customers to
purchase a separate item if they want to purchase the patented item amounts
to per se illegal tying;66 (4) no firm with a market share of less than 50%

unreasonableness of the alleged trade restraint”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221
F.3d 928, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Toys “R” Us did not have a Colgate
right to encourage its suppliers not to sell certain toys to “club” retailers and
affirming the evaluation of such restraints under the Rule of Reason).
63
See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare,
56 Emory L. J. xxx (2006); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act:
The Search for Standards, 93 Geo. L.J. 1623 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (2005); Einer Elhauge,
Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 272 (2003).
64
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
65
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 716-18 (1975).
66
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (2005).
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can be said to be a monopolist;67 (5) even a dominant firm has no obligation
to cooperate with its competitor;68 (6) exclusive dealing is per se legal if
more than 80% of the market remains open to competitors;69 (7) exclusive
dealing cannot be illegal if the non-dominant party is free to terminate the
contract on short notice;70 (8) a firm does not have market power in an after
market if it lacks market power in the primary market;71 (9) bundled
discounts are not unlawful unless an equally efficient competitor making
only one product covered by the discount would have to price below its cost
in order to compete;72 and (10) a firm can never be liable for
monopolization based on the mere fact that it has designed its products in a
way that harms competitors.73
For its part, the Supreme Court has not yet given a strong indication of
any general predilection for rules or standards with respect to exclusionary
practices. In Kodak, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion made a nod
toward standards: “Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions
rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.
This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis,
focusing on the “particular facts disclosed by the record.’”74 As discussed
below, a number of lower court judges have taken this admonition as a
general preference for post-hoc determinations in exclusionary conduct
cases.75 But it is not clear that a consistent majority of the Supreme Court’s
67

Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945) (opining that “it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent [market
share] would be enough” to constitute a monopoly); and Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v.
Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (observing that a 50% market
share is a “prerequisite for a finding of monopoly”); with Broadway Delivery Corp.
v. United Parcel Service, 651 F.2d 122, 127-29 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a 50%
market share is not a prerequisite for being a monopolist).
68
See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985).
69
ANTITRUST LAW, 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 222 (5th ed. 2002)
(surveying cases and reporting that there thus exists a “virtual safe harbor . . . for
market foreclosure of 20 percent or less”).
70
United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005).
71
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
72
Ortho Diagnostic Sys. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
73
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for per se
immunity from antitrust liability for product design of patented goods).
74
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992).
75
See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
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justices in the past two decades would prefer to shun rules in exclusionary
conduct cases. In two of its most recent decisions, the Court has seemingly
applied rules corresponding to examples (1) and (5) above.76 On the other
hand, it rejected rule (8) in favor of a more fact-specific approach.77
Example (3) was once the rule but the Court recently heard argument on the
issue and appears open to reconsidering it.78 The Court’s most recent
exclusionary practices decision, involving discriminatory manufacturer
rebates to dealers selling to different customers, formulated its holding in a
fairly rule-like way, although it left open the possibility that the rule might
not apply in extraordinary cases.79 But the Court has heard so few
exclusionary conduct cases in the last few years that it is difficult to
extrapolate a general direction.
On the other hand, there is a definite trend in the lower courts in favor
of standards over rules. In many of the recent significant exclusionary
practices cases, the lower courts have rejected categorical rules that would
either have created or immunized against liability for exclusionary
practices, even though there was often support for such rules in case law
precedent or in the academic literature. In Microsoft,80 the D.C. Circuit
rejected the district court’s per se approach to the tying of Windows and
Internet Explorer and remanded for consideration under a full rule of reason
approach, but also rejected Microsoft’s argument that its product design
decisions were “per se lawful.” In Dentsply,81 the Third Circuit rejected

76

See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985).
77
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
78
See Transcript of Oral Argument in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc., No. No. 04-1329 2005 WL 3370426, 74 USLW 3350 (Nov. 29, 2005).
79
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., ___ U.S. ___,
2006 WL 43971 (Jan. 10, 2006) (holding that manufacturer ordinarily may not be
held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers
competing to resell its product to the same retail customer).
80
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (2001). Microsoft deviates from
earlier Supreme Court decisions that had seemed to impose a rule of per se
illegality where the defendant has market power in the tying market. E.g, Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
81
U.S. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005). The possibility
of a “rule” in this area is shown by cases like Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser
Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984), where the Seventh Circuit held

18

2006]

Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication

19

defendant’s argument that an exclusive dealing arrangement could not be
exclusionary if the customer could terminate it at will. In Ticketmaster,82
the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that an exclusive dealing
contract of six years of duration was “inherently unreasonable.” In
LePage’s,83 the Third Circuit held that bundled discounts are not subject to
bright-line cost/revenue comparison tests applicable in predatory pricing
cases, but must be evaluated based on whether they have exclusionary
effects. In Spirit,84 the Sixth Circuit held that even in single product
predation cases a dominant firm does not have an absolute defense if it
priced above its cost. In Conwood,85 the Sixth Circuit held that the facts
that output was expanding, new products were being introduced, and the
plaintiff’s market share increased during the period of the alleged
monopolization did not categorically negate the possibility that the
defendant was monopolizing. Framing the governing law as a rule would
have been possible in all of these cases, but the courts declined in
preference for a standard-based approach.
In these and a number of other recent exclusionary practices decisions,
federal appellate courts have signaled that simple rules are insufficient to
address the diverse and complex business practices governed by the
antitrust laws addressed to exclusionary practices. Rhetorical slogans
expressing the impossibility of rule-based monopolization law are being
repeated in the leading cases, linking together disparate exclusionary
practices cases to form a common standard-oriented jurisprudence. Courts
have taken Kodak admonition against “legal presumptions based on
formalistic distinctions”86 as a mandate for adjudicatory flexibility and post
hoc decision making.87 The D.C. Circuit’s proclamation that
“[a]nticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms, and is
too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have

that exclusive dealing contracts “terminable in less than a year are presumptively
lawful.”
82
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 Fed.Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005).
83
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc).
84
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951-52 (6th Cir.
2005).
85
Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788-91 (6th Cir. 2002).
86
See supra at xxx.
87
United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2005); Z-Tel
Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522
(E.D. Tex. 2004); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35
F.Supp.2d 1138 (D. Minn. 1999); USAirways Group, Inc. v. British Airways PLC,
989 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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enumerated all the varieties”88 is gaining popularity—and an aura of
inevitability—through repetition.89 The implication is that since it is
impossible to catalogue anticompetitive practices ex ante, the liability
determinants governing exclusionary practices can never be decided until a
particular practice is examined in context in litigation. Another popular
maxim, derived from the Supreme Court’s Continental Ore decision,
cautions courts to give plaintiffs “the full benefit of their proof without
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the
slate clean after scrutiny of each.”90 Courts sometimes employ the
Continental Ore maxim to justify rejecting rule-based holdings in
exclusionary practices cases, reasoning that no single rule can exonerate the
defendant since the legality of each practice depends upon its interaction
with other practices.91 This approach lessens the possibility of a rule-bound
approach to exclusionary practices cases by increasing the number of
variables necessary to determine liability.
To be sure, courts still adjudicate some exclusionary practices cases
based on rules. A prominent recent example includes the Department of
Justice’s losing predatory pricing lawsuit against American Airlines that
was dismissed on summary judgment because the government could not
demonstrate that American priced below its cost.92 But the trend is clearly
in the opposite direction. As with collaborative practices, the lower courts,
largely unchecked by the Supreme Court, have been moving exclusionary
practices cases into open-ended, fact-specific adjudication.

88

Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087
(D.C.Cir.1998).
89
See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 951; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 152; Conwood, 290 F.3d at
784; Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d
513, 522 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
90
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699
(1962).
91
See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358,
1364 (3d Cir. 1992); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F.Supp.2d
686, 699 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications,
Inc., 331 F.Supp.2d 513, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2004); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, II
ANTITRUST LAW, § 310c, 147 (1996) ( “In a monopolization case conduct must
always be analyzed ‘as a whole.’ A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant
position is likely to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each one
viewed in isolation might be viewed as de minimis or an error in judgment, but the
pattern gives increased plausibility to the claim.”).
92
U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
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II. THE POSSIBILITY OF (REAL) RULES
Before proceeding much further, it is worth pausing to consider the
possibility that a world of antitrust rules would be illusory because, in
practice, rules always fade into standards. Take H.L.A. Hart’s observation
that “[n]atural languages like English are . . . irreducibly open-textured”
when specifying “general classifying terms,”93 or Wittgenstein’s point that
the problem with rules is that they do not tell you when they should be
applied.94 Because language is irreducibly open-textured and indeterminate
and because rules lack internal mechanisms to specify when they should be
applied, even when the law is formally framed as a rule, it requires
penumbral rules, canons of interpretation, and other secondary decisional
criteria which end up swallowing the apparent simplicity of the rule.95
Specifying the governing law as a simple, bright-line rule may merely
conceal the fact that important balancing of social interests, weighing of
probabilities, and choosing between competing ends and means lurk in the
shadow of the rule. Declaring a legal rule thus appears misleading or even
dishonest because it hides the social preferences that animate the decisionmaker’s conclusion.
Under one interpretation, antitrust law provides the perfect illustration
for Hart and Wittgenstein’s point. In this view, there never have been such
things as case-determinative antitrust rules—only standards clad in rulebound rhetoric. The current march toward standards, then, is not so much a
change in liability determinants as a dissipation of the mystery surrounding
antitrust’s concealed methodology. In a moment, I will dispute this
possibility and argue that the specification of antitrust law as rule or
standard has very important practical consequences. But first, it is worth
acknowledging the extent to which Hart and Wittgenstein’s observation
rings true in antitrust.
A case in point is antitrust law’s long-standing per se prohibition
against “price fixing.” As any antitrust practitioner will recognize, price
fixing appears in quotation marks because application of the per se rule
depends not on the fact that competitors have literally fixed prices but that
the challenged conduct falls within the antitrust category known as “price
93

H.L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994)
Ludwig Wittengenstein, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§143-252 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953); see Scott Hershovitz, Wittgenstein on Rules: The
Phantom Menace, 22 Oxford. J. Legal Stud. 619 (2002).
95
Hart, supra n. xxx at 128; see also Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant:
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 599 (1994) (arguing that
rules almost always become “impossibly cumbersome and complex”).
94
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fixing.” The judicial decision often thought to have established the per se
rule against price-fixing did not involve price fixing either literally or
figuratively but rather a gentleman’s agreement by dominant oil producers
to buy up distressed oil from small refineries and thereby stabilize the
wholesale market.96 The defendants never came close to agreeing on price.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any “combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce”
amounts to “price fixing” in the relevant legal sense, whether or not the
defendants have actually done the act that a lay person might suppose
“price fixing” to be—fixing a price.97
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has described an act of literal
price fixing by horizontal competitors—an agreement on prices for blanket
licensing of musical repertoires—as something other than “price fixing”
and hence subject to the rule of reason.98 In BMI v. CBS, the Supreme
Court rejected textual “literalism” and held that application of the per se
rule against price fixing is not as “simplistic” as “determining whether two
or more potential competitors have literally ‘fixed’ a ‘price.’” Rather, “[a]s
generally used in the antitrust field, ‘price fixing’ is a shorthand way of
describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule
has been held applicable.”99 Application of the per se rule turns not on
whether the conduct amounts literally to price fixing but on whether the
“particular practice is one of those types or that it is ‘plainly
anticompetitive’ and very likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’”100 This flex
in the per se rule invites endless pages of briefing on whether the conduct at
issue should be properly characterized as “price fixing” because it
unjustifiably tampers with the market mechanism for determining prices or
as something else because its can be justified by efficiencies, a very
standardish way of doing law.101 Hence, Hart’s point that rules inevitably
dissolve into standards and Wittgentsein’s point that rules do not tell us
when to apply them.
96

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Id. at 223.
98
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
99
Id. at 9.
100
Id.
101
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685 (1991); William H. Page,
The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221, 1257-62 (1989).
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But although rules may not be as neatly confined as they sometimes
give the appearance of being, it would be wrong to suppose that the
specification of antitrust law as either rule or standard has no practical
consequences. Indeed, it has many. First, when judicial decisions about
certain forms of conduct takes on a rule-bound rhetorical form, it is not
always possible to recharacterize the conduct to avoid application of the
rule. For example, given the strong efficiencies of the challenged conduct,
one might have recharacterized Topco as involving a vertical rather
horizontal restraint and thereby avoided application of the per se rule.102
However, it was sufficiently obvious that the exclusivity system was a
horizontal territorial allocation agreement that even its uncontested
efficiencies were insufficient to save the arrangement. Even in decisions
since the Supreme Court’s “recharacterization” cases such as BMI and
NCAA,103 conduct that paradigmatically fit the per se archetypes has not
escaped per se condemnation. In Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Court
condemned as per se unlawful what amounted to a strike by criminal
defense lawyers.104 In Palmer, the court summarily reversed a court of
appeals decision that a market division agreement between competing bar
review courses should be analyzed under the rule of reason. So while the
indeterminacy of language may render a rule-based approach porous in
borderline cases, it does not preclude fairly mechanical application of rules
in paradigmatic cases.
The specification of a liability determinant as either a rule or a standard
may also critically affect the choice of who the ultimate legal decisionmaker will be: jury, trial judge, or appellate court. In U.S. legal culture,
deference by players higher in the judicial hierarchy to players lower in the
hierarchy depends in part on how the governing liability norm is framed.
Trial judges are more likely to enter case-dispositive rulings on motions to
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Defendants unsuccessfully attempted this in U.S. v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 87
S.Ct. 1847, 1850, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967), but the Court characterized the licensorlicensee relationship as horizontal because the licensees owned substantially all of
the licensor’s stock. See also Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp., 651 F.2d
422, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that competitors are not allowed to turn an
otherwise horizontal agreement into a vertical one by setting up a licensing
corporation to impose market allocation agreements).
103
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
104
Confusingly, the Court primarily analyzed the lawyers’ strike as a horizontal
boycott, even though the case did not fit the per se boycott category articulated in
recent cases. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co. 472 U.S. 28 (1985) and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986).
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dismiss or for summary judgment, a directed verdict, or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict if the governing law is framed as a rule than if it
is a standard. Rule-oriented liability determinants allow the court to isolate
a small number of dispositive facts in the record and hinge a dispositive
order on the incontestability of those facts (or the absence of a proof on a
critical fact): i.e., the defendant did not price below average variable cost;
the contract was terminable at will with ten days’ notice; the defendant’s
market share was 30% indicating a lack of market power; the manufacturer
and wholesaler agreed on a minimum resale price.
Trial judges may be more reluctant to enter case-dispositive rulings
where the governing law is framed as a standard. Since liability or
exculpation turns on multiple facts, which often must be weighed and
balanced against one another, standard-based liability criteria are often said
to create “issues of fact” that cannot be summarily decided on the
sufficiency of the complaint or the undisputed facts in the record.105 If the
trial judge does enter a dispositive order (usually, an order granting
summary judgment for the defendant) after applying a liability standard, the
appellate court should in principle review the matter de novo. In practice,
however, appellate judges often quietly defer to trial court judgments based
on multiple criteria rather than reinvestigate a complex and burdensome
record.106 When liability determinants are framed as standards, trial judges

105

For instance, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a restraint of trade is
said to be a question of fact. See California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 224 F.3d 942,
958-59 (9th Cir. 2000); Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v. Winchester Tobacco
Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1965).
106
In factually dense rule of reason cases, it is not unusual for the Circuit Court of
Appeals to say something along the following lines, often in an unpublished
opinion: “After carefully considering each of these issues in light of the
voluminous summary judgment record before the district court, we affirm for the
reasons stated in the district court’s thorough Memorandum Opinion.” Schueller v.
Norman, 46 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1995) (unpublished disposition). Of course,
sometimes cases involving conduct subject to the per se rule also present factually
dense summary judgment records and also invite appellate deference to the district
court’s summary judgment ruling. E.g., Hall v. American Airlines, Inc., 118
Fed.Appx. 680 (4th Cir. 2004). However, questions of antitrust policy in per se
cases (as supposed to questions of commission—did or did not the defendants
agree?, for example) are usually treated as crystallized question of law inviting
truly de novo appellate review. See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that district court’s determination that
agreement was per se illegal would be reviewed de novo and citing AreedaHovenkamp treatise for the proposition that although a court’s determination that
the per se rule applies “might involve many fact questions, the selection of a mode

24

2006]

Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication

25

often will take this as a signal that they should be sparing in entering
dispositive orders, but when they do enter dispositive orders after
canvassing a complex record, they will often receive deference in the court
of appeals. If the appellate court does reverse, this usually means that
ultimate decision-making is allocated to the jury. Rarely will the court of
appeals reinvestigate the entire record under a standard-based decisional
criterion and reverse the decision of the jury.107
So the specification of antitrust law as a rule or a standard does have
practical importance in allocating decision-making. In general, the more
that a body of law expresses itself in rules as opposed to standards, the
more frequently that appellate courts will be the ultimate decision-makers.
The more that a body of law expresses itself in standards as opposed to
rules, the more frequently both trial judges and reviewing courts will insist
that the matter must be committed to the discretion of the jury in a jury trial,
the district court in a bench trial, or the agency or administrative law judge
in an administrative proceeding.108 Or, if the trial court does enter a
dispositive ruling under a multi-factored decisional criterion, the appellate
court will often defer to the dispositive rulings of the district court rather
than reinvestigate the record. Hence, the practical effect of rules is to push
ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy and the effect of standards
is to push ultimate decision-making down the legal hierarchy.
A related point is that framing the governing liability determinant as a
rule encourages trial courts to play a gate-keeping role to prevent weaker
[of analysis] is entirely a question of law.”) (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1909b (1998)).
107
One the rare cases where this occurred was Brooke Group, where the Supreme
Court undertook sufficiency of the evidence review and reversed the jury’s primary
line price discrimination liability verdict. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Although primary line price
discrimination is subject to a below-cost rule, the Supreme Court did not decide the
case based on that rule but on the implausibility of the claim that Brown &
Williamson could have recouped its costs of predation, a decidedly more standardlike question.
108
Technically, factual findings are never committed to the discretion of
administrative law judges. The FTC may review factual findings of its ALJs de
novo and courts of appeal review factual findings of the FTC under the usually
deferential substantial evidence standard. Schering Plough Corp., Docket No.
9297, slip op. at 8 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003);16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
However, where the FTC’s factual findings differ from those of the ALJ, the court
of appeals gives less deference to the agency’s factual findings, Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062-63 (2005), which gives the Commission some
incentive to avoid overruling its ALJs on questions of fact.
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cases from reaching a jury. The Supreme Court’s Matsushita109 decision
encourages such gate-keeping by trial courts in complex antitrust cases. In
theory, Matsushita should create a gate-keeping culture in both antitrust
cases governed by rules and those governed by standards, since trial courts
are directed to inquire into the economic plausibility of the plaintiff’s
claims before allowing them to go to a jury.110 In practice, however, courts
have resisted using Matsushita to justify the grant of summary judgment or
directed verdict in cases involving practices governed by the rule of reason
or generalized monopolization standards.111 They have been more apt to
invoke their gate-keeping function in cases involving rules, whether
prohibitory or exculpatory, such as the per se prohibition on price fixing112
and the below-cost pricing rule for predatory pricing.113 Some courts have
explicitly distinguished between the use of the Matsushita “plausibility”
screen in alleged conspiracy cases (bound by a per se rule) and tying cases
like Kodak114 where, although a per se rule nominally applies, economic
analysis rather than a priori legal categories is generally dispositive.115
Courts are more comfortable playing gatekeeper to the jury when a

109

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Id. at xxx.
111
See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499
(4th Cir. 2002); Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 979 F.2d 806
(11th Cir. 1992); Instructional Systems Development Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.
Co., 817 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1987); but see Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America,
Inc., 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1988).
112
See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004);
InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000);
Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 1999);
but see Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 472-74 (3d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that defendants’ alleged behavior would be per se illegal as group
boycott if proven and denying summary judgment after conducting “Matsushita
implausibility” analysis).
113
See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir.
1995); Stearns Airport Equipment Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518 (5th Cir.
1999); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.
1988); U.S. v. AMR Corp., 140 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 335 F.3d
1109 (10th Cir. 2003); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 944 F.Supp.
66 (D. Mass 1996); but see Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995).
114
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
115
Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir.
1999).
110
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formalized rule rather than an amorphous standard supplies the liability
determinant.
Finally, rules signal a greater importance for lawyers and standards
signal a greater role for economists in antitrust adjudication. The rising
influence of economists in the antitrust agencies coincided with, and
probably influenced, the shift from rules to standards.116 While economists
have some importance in cases governed by rules (for example, to explain
whether a price was below cost or a pattern of parallel prices supports an
inference of collusion), their testimony is more likely to be curtailed or
excluded when the governing liability criteria are articulated as rules than
as standards. Rules are imperative—they can be “violated,” “broken,”
“ignored,” and “disregarded.” Standards are subjunctive—they ask a
question that can be answered in any number of ways. In a case governed
by a rule, an economist who disagrees with some premise in the rule is
liable to find his testimony rejected by the court.117 In a case governed by a
standard, the gate keeping function of the court will generally be limited to
ensuring the scientific reliability of the economist’s presentation.118 It is
hard to reject an economist’s testimony for being contrary to a standard
when the standard is framed in terms like “reasonableness” and
“exclusionary.”
The choice between rules and standards matters in antitrust. As an
expression of legal culture, articulation of antitrust law as rule prejudges
many outcomes, pushes ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy,
encourages judges to play a stronger gate-keeping role, and widens the
scope of allowable economic testimony and other evidence. Even if it turns
out that the “rules” governing these practices are as indeterminate and
malleable as Hart and Wittgenstein’s comments on language would suggest,
antitrust judges perform their legal-cultural roles differently when the

116

See Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential Control Versus
Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 269, 282-84 (1990) (arguing that the changing antitrust policy of the
Department of Justice in the 1980s was caused by the hiring of more economists in
the Antitrust Division).
117
Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1322 (11th Cir.
2003) (affirming exclusion of testimony of economist who failed to “differentiate
between lawful, conscious parallelism and collusive price fixing”); Information
Resources, Inc. v. The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F.Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (excluding economist’s testimony to the extent he could not show that
defendant’s prices were below variable cost).
118
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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liability determinant is framed as a rule than when it is framed as a
standard.
III. EFFICIENCY REASONS FOR CHOOSING RULES OR STANDARDS
So far we have seen that antitrust is moving in the direction of flexible,
post hoc standards and that this has significant consequences for antitrust
adjudication. Is this movement desirable? The answer depends in part on
what normative goals one uses to measure the success of competition
policy. If efficiency is the goal, as generally assumed today,119 the
movement toward standards is not unambiguously positive. The effects of
such a transition are felt both within litigation in terms of the costs and
accuracy of adjudication and within the realm of market behavior because
of the varying incentive effects of rules and standards. This section
considers the different ways in which the choice between antitrust rules and
standards affects the efficiency outcomes of the antitrust enterprise and
concludes with some decisional principles to guide the choice.120
A. Costs of Promulgating and Administering the Legal Command
Louis Kaplow has formulated an economic model in which the choice
between rules and standards turns on the costs of promulgating and
administering the law and the incentive effects caused by the choice
between the two.121 Kaplow observes that when a legal command will be
applied frequently, costs are minimized by framing the command as a rule
since there are economies of scale to figuring out the optimal content of law
ex ante.122 Conversely, when the legal command will be applied
infrequently, it may be less costly to wait and see whether a particular
circumstance actually arises before deciding on the content of the legal
command.123 The costs of the rules versus standards choice is also affected
by the degree to which individuals subject to the command acquire legal
advice ex ante. In general, it is less costly for individuals to acquire
knowledge about rules and therefore more likely that they will and the
119

See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (distinguishing
between “decision rules” that govern governmental decision-making and “conduct
rules” that govern the conduct of regulated actors).
121
Kaplow, supra n. xxx.
122
Id. at 577.
123
Id.
120
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acquisition of the knowledge about rules makes it more likely that
individuals will conform their behavior to the law.124
Antitrust law applies to a finite number of archetypes of industrial
behavior: vertical resale price maintenance; tying; merger; refusal to deal;
below-cost pricing; exclusive dealing; joint venture; territorial allocation;
patent pooling; and perhaps twenty or thirty more. Business transactions
occur within each of these categories with high frequency. The financial
stakes from running afoul of the law—felony convictions, treble damages,
attorneys fees, stock price declines—are high compared to the (also not
inexpensive) cost of legal advice. Following Kaplow’s model, there are
economies of scale to be achieved by ex ante promulgation of the relevant
legal command as to these behavioral archetypes and a high likelihood that
the subjects of the legal command will acquire knowledge about the legal
command.
One objection to antitrust rules governing industrial archetypes is that
they could not possibly cover every category of potentially anticompetitive
conduct. Hence, the D.C. Circuit’s previously mentioned admonition that
“[a]nticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms, and is
too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have
enumerated all the varieties”125 This maxim makes sense when understood
as an admonition against attempting to catalogue in advance every possible
permutation of antitrust conduct and specifying its liability determinants—
that would be excessively costly as to infrequently practiced forms of
anticompetitive behavior. But the maxim does not make sense as applied to
archetypal industrial behavior that is frequently the subject of antitrust
litigation. In its recent Spirit decision, the Sixth Circuit invoked the
Caribbean Broadcasting maxim to explain why Northwest Airlines could
be liable for lowering its price on its Detroit-Philadelphia and DetroitBoston flights.126 According to the court, even if the lowering of the prices
did not amount to predatory pricing, that fact should not be dispositive on
liability since anticompetitive conduct can take forms other than predatory
pricing. But the alleged conduct at issue was archetypal predation—
lowering price to drive out a rival—which has been the subject of hundreds
of predation cases which have yielded well-known predatory pricing
liability rules. It is no reason to avoid framing or applying liability rules as
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Id. at 577.
Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087
(D.C.Cir.1998).
126
See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 951.
125
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to paradigmatic and frequent occurrences that it would be too costly to
frame rules for non-paradigmatic and infrequent occurrences.127
There are difficulties in applying this cost-based preference for rules in
paradigmatic cases. Easterbrook rightly complains that the standard-based
approach to antitrust creates high litigation costs,128 but also does not want
to return to the per se rule, which he finds excessively interventionist.129
Rather, Easterbrook proposes a series of strong, but not quite rule-like,
presumptions, such as the use of a market-power screen and a requirement
that plaintiff “demonstrate that the defendant’s practices are capable of
enriching the defendant by harming consumers.”130 These presumptions,
however, can be every bit as vague as the rule of reason. How does one
know whether a firm has market power without defining a relevant
market?131 How does one know whether the defendant’s practices are
capable of enriching defendant by harming consumers without analyzing
the actual effects of the conduct on prices and output levels?
So here lies a dilemma. Per se rules of illegality are often vastly
overbroad but an open-ended rule of reason approach would create
excessive litigation costs and uncertainty. Clear rules are necessary to
provide optimal incentives to engage in beneficial competitive behavior and
127

The Sixth Circuit seemed to believe that Northwest’s conduct was
distinguishable from ordinary predation because Northwest had not only lowered
its price but added capacity to absorb demand diverted from Spirit. 431 F.3d at
951. That distinction makes no sense. Every predator will have to expand its
capacity to absorb the business diverted from the prey and every predator facing a
downward sloping demand curve will have to further expand its output to absorb
new demand occasioned by the lower price. Lowering price and adding capacity
go hand in hand in virtually every predation case.
128
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1984)
“When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive . . . . Litigation costs are the
product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination
more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the rule of reason.”).
129
Id. at 10.
130
Id. at 17-18.
131
Easterbrook is confident that the market definition question can often be
answered without resort to a full market definition inquiry, which he rightly
identifies as a “fool’s errand.” Id. at 22. He believes that it is possible to
“ascertain power directly” by using “either evidence of inability to raise price or
evidence of price covariance between the defendant’s goods and the products of
rivals.” Id. Easterbrook is right a court may be able to rule out the possibility that
the defendant has market power without reaching a definitive conclusion as to what
is the relevant market in some platonic sense, but the tools he describes to conduct
the inquiry are the same sorts of fact-intensive, economically complex tools
ordinarily used in market definition inquiries.
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reduce litigation costs but relatively few forms of industrial behavior should
be negatively sanctioned without a careful inquiry into their motivation and
market effects. As in most “rules versus standards” discussions, the debate
quickly reaches a stalemate.
The solution, though imperfect, is to use bright-line rules as
immunizing devices for broad swaths of industrial behavior while
preserving a role for standards in determining liability for conduct falling
outside of the safe harbors created by the rules. For many categories of
conduct, such an approach minimizes the cost of configuring the law
because the rule itself supplies a conclusive answer of no liability or
presents a safe harbor that defendants can elect in order to minimize the
likelihood of litigation. For example, specifying that a firm cannot be held
liable for tying unless it has at least a 50% market share in the tying market
would provide a case-dispositive safe harbor that could reduce litigation
costs substantially in a large number of tying cases, even though such costs
would remain in cases where the defendant’s market share exceeded 50%.
While it would also save costs to specify prohibitory rules for cases falling
outside the safe harbor (such as making tying per se unlawful if the
defendant’s tying product market share exceeds 50%), the generalization of
such a rule would be vastly overbroad. Bright-line rules are most
appropriate in antitrust when used as immunizing devices. Relatively few
categories of conduct are unambiguously harmful and can be prohibited in
equally categorical terms.
Even as to the 50% market share immunizing rule, there remains the
question whether such a rule would be penny wise but pound foolish by
saving litigation costs while licensing firms to engage in socially costly
tying behavior. I consider that overinclusion question next.
B. Underinclusion, Overinclusion, Adjudicative Error, and Incentive
Effects
There is an oddity in the timing of antitrust law’s progression from
rules to standards. This transition has taken place during the same time
frame as antitrust law has settled on allocative efficiency as its primary, if
not sole, objective. In the currently dominant paradigm, antitrust law is
supposed to deter firms from engaging in collusive or exclusionary conduct
resulting in deadweight losses attendant to the output reductions that result
from price increases.132 Antitrust today is primarily concerned with
132

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE ¶ 1.3b at 19-20 (2d ed. 1999).
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incentive effects and not with compensation or distributive justice.133 But,
if that is true, the case for open-ended standards and post hoc adjudication
seems prima facie weak. One strong advantage of rules over standards is
predictability, which matters most when one is trying to incentivize
appropriate behavior.
This last statement is subject to a caveat. Predictability may be
disadvantageous if the lawmaker is trying to limit behavior of dubious, but
uncertain, social value. Take sexual harassment. A legal rule specifying
every form of prohibited behavior would have the disadvantage of
providing a roadmap for boors to avoid liability while continuing to be
boors. One could respond by adding further boorish behavior to the list of
prohibitions, but sooner or later the rule-makers would begin to sense that
adding further categories to the list would be overly cumbersome and dilute
the seriousness of more offensive categories of behavior already on the list.
By instead framing the liability determinant vaguely,134 the EEOC has
discouraged a wide range of behavior that has low social value but might
not be prohibited if all forms of misbehavior were catalogued in advance.
So uncertainty about the legal determinant can have healthy deterrent
effects.
Antitrust is not that way. It regulates business behavior that generally
has high social value but is somewhat “tipsy”—at a certain point, the
conduct tips suddenly from beneficial to harmful. For example: lowering
prices is highly socially valuable until suddenly they are so low that
competitors are driven out of the market leading to long-term price
increases;135 product innovation is highly socially valuable until the new
design abruptly shuts out competitors from an after-market;136 cross133

On the trade-offs between total social welfare (i.e., efficiency) and consumer
welfare, see Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1, 4-5
(1982); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1032-33 (1987).
On the predominance of total welfare concerns in antitrust today, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9-32 (2d ed. 2001). For a contrary view, see Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 68-69 (1982).
134
“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature” that create “an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a).
135
See Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx.
136
See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1121, 1142 (1983); Kara E. Harchuck, Microsoft IV: The Dangers to Innovation

32

2006]

Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication

33

licensing patented technology lowers production costs and improves quality
until it becomes a mechanism for price-fixing;137 and information exchange
between competitors lowers search costs and helps firms rationalize
production decisions until it tips over and facilitates cartelization.138
Antitrust is not a field in which unpredictability of litigation outcomes is
beneficial because chilling broad categories of low-value behavior is
desirable. Most of the conduct adjacent to the harmful conduct is valuable.
Predictability in antitrust is thus important, but it is not a sufficient
reason to justify rules even for a system concerned primarily with incentive
effects. If the rules cannot be framed to correspond closely to socially
optimal behavioral criteria, then the rules will provide predictability but not
the right incentives. Broad rules often fail to capture socially optimal
outcomes. The 55 mile-per-hour speed limit slows down some drivers who
would be perfectly safe at 70 and speeds up some drivers who are
dangerous at any speed over 40. Rules tend toward over-and underinclusion, which dulls the advantage of their predictability. The “rules
versus standards” debate thus descends into the following kind of stalemate:
Rules, more than standards, provide ex ante notice of the law’s command
and therefore enable the law’s subjects to conform their behavior to its
dictates.139 This is widely thought to be a virtue of rules, particularly if one
is concerned about due process values or deterring undesirable behavior.140

Posed by the Irresponsible Application of a Rule of Reason Analysis to Product
Design Claims, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 395 (2002).
137
See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001).
138
See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that
an informal arrangement among corrugated container manufacturers to share bid
information on specific customer contracts was sufficient to find an unlawful
restraint of trade); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 41112 (1921) (affirming the district court’s finding that a manufacturers’ association
information-sharing plan was an unlawful restraint of trade that contributed to a
significant decrease in production and increase in prices).
139
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217 (1982).
140
Due process is particularly important when the sanction for violation is criminal
punishment including lengthy incarceration. It is thus not surprising that the
current enforcement practice of the federal government is not to criminally
prosecute any behavior other than hard-core cartels, which are subject to a sharply
delineated per se rule. See Department of Justice, Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and
Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm (visited 1/21/06).
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But standards are more likely than rules to locate the precise dividing line
between desirable and undesirable behavior. Rules are more likely than
standards to be overinclusive or underinclusive. Finally, promulgation of
law as a standard is more likely than promulgation of law as a rule to result
in adjudicatory error, since there are more variables to consider and the
relationship between the variables is exponentially more complex.
Let us examine these proposition more closely with a careful eye on the
peculiarities of antitrust law. If antitrust law is framed in a rule-like way, it
is more likely that firms will be able to avoid some of the inefficient and
consumer-harming behavior with which antitrust law is concerned because
they will have clearer advance guidance. But because the rules will
necessarily be over- and under-inclusive,141 rent-seeking firms will find the
loopholes and zones of underinclusion and exploit them to cause
inefficiencies and harm to consumers. At the same time, some “innocent”
firms will either be penalized for engaging in conduct that is efficient and
does not harm consumers or will simply forgo that conduct, finding less
efficient and consumer-friendly ways of doing business. At this level of
generality, the argument between rules and standards still reaches a draw.
The impasse can be broken by considering the remedial features of
antitrust law. In a civil case, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover
automatically trebled damages.142 To the extent that the antitrust violation
was difficult to detect, this multiplier may simply ensure that antitrust
violations do not have a positive expected value.143 But apart from hardcore price fixing or bid rigging cartels and similar conspiracies, the conduct
giving rise to many antitrust violations is not difficult to detect since many
violations arise from publicly perspicuous business practices.144 While it
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See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y
703, 710 (1991) (arguing that “rules are necessarily under- and over-inclusive with
respect to the sets of reasons that support or ground them”); Schauer, supra n. xxx
at 31-34 (describing rules as “entrenched generalizations likely to be under- and
over-inclusive in particular cases).
142
15 U.S.C. § 15.
143
See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
144
For example, the Visa and Mastercard bylaw requiring issuer banks not to issue
other credit cards had been in place for years, and approved by an earlier court of
appeals decision, before the Second Circuit disapproved it under the rule of reason
in the Department of Justice action. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.
(Mountainwest), 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994). With thousands of participating
banks, it is inconceivable that the bylaw could have remained a secret. See also
Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at xxx (discussing how
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may be difficult for the court to determine whether to find the conduct a
violation, such adjudicatory uncertainty is just as likely to result in a false
positive as a false negative, so the ex ante incentive effects are a wash.145
Even where there is only a one in three chance that the conduct will be
detected, other costs of an adverse judgment deter the antitrust violation.
Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees from the
defendant, but the defendant does not have a reciprocal right.146 This
unilateral fee shifting comes on top of the costs that the defendant incurs to
defend the suit, including not only hiring attorneys and economists but the
time and effort of its executives called upon to aid in the defense of the
case, produce documents, and testify in deposition or at trial. And then
there are reputational effects from an adverse judgment. The filing of an
antitrust lawsuit may cause a decline in the defendant’s stock price
exceeding the net present value of the expected damages judgment and
costs of defense (since shareholders may take the lawsuit as a signal of
careless or incompetent managers).147 The intra-firm reputations, status,
and compensation of individual managers may be at risk, causing them to
be particularly careful to avoid actions that would bring about an adverse
judgment to the firm.148
Antitrust law is thus powerfully structured to deter violations. Now
consider the implications for underinclusion and overinclusion. Say that
there is a dividing line x that represents the exact point of demarcation
between conduct that is socially desirable and undesirable. The function of
a standard is to locate x as closely as possible. Ex ante, the subject of the
standard—let us call her A—does not know exactly where x will fall, but
makes her own estimate. Having located her own estimate at y, she will
only approach y to the point that the gains from her approach exceed the
probability that she will unknowingly have crossed x, multiplied by the
costs of having crossed x. Since the costs of crossing x are large, A will

predatory pricing relies on reputation effects to be successful, and therefore is
unlikely to be undetected).
145
Except to the extent that the relevant subjects of the law are risk averse, in
which case the difficulty in predicting how a court will decide will prevent some
firms from engaging in the conduct.
146
15 U.S.C. § 15.
147
Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor
Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557, 557-58, 577-79 (1987);
Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?,
40 J. Fin. 793, 799 (1985).
148
See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144-45 (2000).
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keep a safe distance from y. If A’s information about the location of x was
relatively accurate, A will have forgone some socially desirable behavior to
avoid coming close to x.
Framing the law as a rule gives A a better indication of how she is
entitled to behave. It does not completely solve the problem, because there
is some residual uncertainty about how the rule will be enforced and some
risk of adjudicatory error. Let us assume that adjudicatory error is equally
likely to be type one (false negative) as type two (false positive). The cost
of a type two error (treble damages, attorneys fees, reputation effects) are
usually going to be greater to A than the benefits of a type one error
(monopoly profits).149 So A will still back away somewhat from the
dividing line specified by the rule.
Because it must be formulated ex ante, without knowledge of all of the
facts, and for a class of conduct rather than a particular case, the rule will
tend to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. But, because of the
remedial structure of antitrust law, underinclusion may cost less than
underinclusion would in other circumstances. The uncertainty about
application and the risk of adjudicatory error, multiplied by the heavy cost
of an adverse judgment, will cause A to keep away from the line established
by an underinclusive rule. Suppose again that x marks the exact dividing
line between socially desirable and undesirable behavior. If the rule is
framed to create liability at x + 1, subjects of the rule, deterred by expected
costs that exceed expected gains from approaching the line and risk
aversion, may come no closer than x. Hence, the judge or legislator
framing antitrust as a rule can afford to be deliberately underinclusive
without creating suboptimal deterrence.
One could argue that it is also possible to be underinclusive when
framing standards. In order to create optimal incentives given the remedial
structure of antitrust law, the courts could signal loudly that they will be
underinclusive when applying standards after the fact.150 But that is still a
much less certain way to affect incentives than announcing an
underinclusive rule. Another solution is to raise the quantum of evidence
necessary to find a violation (such as requiring clear and convincing

149

See Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at xxx.
The Supreme Court has done this with predatory pricing law, announcing that it
views predation claims with suspicion and that they are presumptively unlikely to
succeed. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
226 (1993).
150
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evidence),151 but this will usually be a less successful strategy than
announcing underinclusive rules since the margin of error in predicting
outcomes will be larger. The ex post nature of the liability determination
that comes with standards weakens the ex ante incentive effects of trying to
announce the standards in an underinclusive way.
Things are somewhat different when it comes to public enforcement.
Criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act must occur in the realm of rules,
as it in fact does.152 The threat of criminal penalties coupled with
unpredictable standards and risk aversion would create excessive deterrence
and due process values would be violated by announcing criminal
punishment for crimes that were determined after the fact based on complex
economic analysis. On the other hand, standards look more attractive than
rules when the government is suing for injunctive relief directed at future
conduct.153 The risk of overdeterring socially beneficial conduct becomes
much smaller and value of avoiding over- or under-inclusion increases
since the legal command will be applied to the future behavior of a specific
person whose unique circumstances are known.154 The purpose of antitrust
law is no longer to create optimal incentives but rather to engage in
command-and-control directives with respect to future behavior. Further,
in injunctive actions by the government the party ultimately deciding the
facts is likely to be either an administrative law judge or a federal district
judge, which reduces the probability of adjudicatory error endemic when
juries apply complex balancing tests. Thus, given the remedial structure of
U.S. antitrust laws, there is a strong case to be made for liability rules for
private adjudication and liability standards for public adjudication where
prospective relief is sought.155
151

See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. xxx
(2006).
152
See supra n. xxx.
153
In principle, the same is true when a private plaintiff sues only for injunctive
relief, although (with the occasional ex ante private challenge to a merger) that is a
very rare occurrence in antitrust.
154
See Kaplow, supra n. xxx at 606 (noting that “if extremely harmful activities are
to be permanently enjoined . . . it is valuable to invest resources to make accurate
determinations in adjudication even if the enhanced accuracy toes not affect ex ante
behavior”).
155
Private plaintiffs might try to take advantage of collateral estoppel principles to
claim that a judgment in favor of the government conclusively determines the
defendant’s liability in a subsequent private action for treble damages, thus
reviving the overdeterrence concerns. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Antitrust
Litigation, 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that certain factual findings made
by the district court in Department of Justice Microsoft litigation were binding on
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C. Choice of Ultimate Decision-Maker
In Kaplow’s model, the content of law is generally assumed to be the
same whether the decision is made ex post (as a rule) or ex ante (as a
standard).156 In antitrust, however, the denomination of law as rule or
standard may affect the allocation of ultimate decision-making authority
and, hence, the content of the law. As discussed in Section II, the effect of
announcing the law as a standard is generally to push ultimate decisionmaking in individual cases down the legal hierarchy—in the direction of the
trial court, administrative law judge, or the jury—and the effect of
announcing the law as a standard is generally to push ultimate decisionmaking up the legal hierarchy—in the direction of the court of appeals.157
If the institutional actors lower in the legal hierarchy tend to have different
levels of competence or systemic biases than those in the upper levels, the
choice of legal form may affect the formulation and application of law.
There is no reason to believe that court of appeals and district courts
generally have different systemic biases, except in the limited sense that
court of appeals judges may be screened more rigorously during their
Senate confirmations and therefore tend slightly more toward the political

Microsoft in subsequent private actions for damages). However, this can be
addressed doctrinally by providing that only findings of fact made in the
governmental litigation would be binding on the defendant in the subsequent
private case, since the law applied in the two cases would be different.
156
Kaplow, supra n. xxx at 570. Kaplow recognizes that this assumption is not
always realistic. Id.
157
Congress may also specify the content of antirust law through legislation.
Putting aside the treble damages remedy, which is decisively rule-like (as
compared to open-ended punitive damages standards), most of the important
concepts in the federal antitrust concepts are articulated as open-ended standards.
The choice between adjudicatory standards is thus delegated to the courts through
the medium of common law development. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 36- 46 (1985) (describing antitrust
statutes as delegating to courts power to develop common law of antitrust); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1705 (1986)
(same) Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544
(1983) (same). This is not inevitable. The Antitrust Modernization Commission is
presently studying a vast array of substantive and procedural antitrust questions and
could recommend to Congress the adoption of legislation creating legislative rules
or various matters. See Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856. The Commission’s website is
http://www.amc.gov.
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center than district court judges.158 There may be a wider competence gap,
however, particularly on complex questions of industrial policy. Court of
appeals judges are somewhat more likely than district judges to be drawn
from academia or policy-oriented political posts, whereas district judges are
more likely to have gained their seat through service as a prosecutor, public
defender, or litigator in a law firm.159 To the extent that formulation of law
as rule tends to push ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy
toward appellate judges, the formulation of complex industrial policy as
rule may be desirable, although the effect may be small.
The effect is considerably larger when it comes to the allocation of
responsibilities to jurors. First, there is some evidence that juries tend to be
predisposed against dominant firms, particularly when the dominant firm
has taken harsh (although not necessarily anticompetitive) action against a
smaller rival.160 Judicial opinions often warn against the dangers of relying
on “bad intent” evidence consisting of violent metaphors culled from
internal business memoranda precisely because this is the sort of evidence
that jurors tend to focus on in otherwise dull antitrust cases that they don’t
understand.161
Further, even if jurors have no systemic biases, they are less competent
on average than judges to decide complex matters of microeconomics,
158

Appellate court nominations are more likely than district court nominations to
be politically contentious. Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the
Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 Judicature 282, 302 (2003). One result of the
increasing politicization of the judicial nomination process has been to produce a
politically centrist circuit court judges. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court
2004 Forward: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 71 (2004).
159
See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). Of course, both trial
judges and court of appeals judges tend often acquire their posts through political
patronage, but patronage is often dispensed along the lines discussed.
160
See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev.
xxx, xxx (2005); Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New
Media and Deviancy, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 51, 52-59 (1995); but see VALERIE P.
HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2000) (questioning claim that juries tend to be biased against big businesses).
161
Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995);
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1990); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883
F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Posner, supra n. xxx at
215 (“Especially misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag
to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of
coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naïve”).

39

CRANE

3/5/2006 2:56 PM

regulatory policy, and industrial organization. This is not to say that jurors
are never competent in antitrust cases. In this regard, it may be useful to
distinguish between two kinds of factual determinations that juries are
called upon to make: personal facts and economic facts. Personal facts
concern the motivations and conduct of the people who made the relevant
business decisions, for example the truthfulness of witnesses, whether the
relevant people took certain actions such as attending meetings, discussing
certain topics, or placing telephone calls, whether they had knowledge of
specified information as of a certain date, and whether they intended to
bring about certain effects. Economic facts concern the efficiency and
economic effects of conduct, for example whether a particular free-riding
concern is justified, whether a particular practice could exclude an equally
efficient competitor, whether the defendant has market power, and whether
specified conduct was more likely to contract or expand output. Personal
facts require no great business sophistication and are likely to be within the
ken of an ordinary juror. Economic facts often involve contested economic
theories and are far outside the educational, experiential, and intellectual
range of the ordinary juror.
Cases governed by rules are more likely than those governed by
standards to be resolved by reference to personal facts. For example, price
fixing cases—bound by a per se rule—turn on whether the defendants
agreed on price, a matter that does not necessarily involve complex
economic theory. Although the jurors may still be exposed to conflicting
economic testimony propounded to explain how parallel prices could (or
could not have) emerged absent (or with) an agreement, the economic
testimony will usually be merely corroborative of more direct evidence,
such as fact witness testimony, diaries, phone logs, itineraries, and
correspondence.162 Such cases raise fairly ordinary questions about human
nature and conduct not unlike other kinds of criminal conspiracy cases. On
the other hand, an open-ended monopolization jury instruction like that
given in LePage’s—did the defendant exclude the plaintiff on some basis
other than efficiency?163—makes liability turn on economic facts which the
average juror is ill-equipped to address. Suppose that the defendant has
used a particular practice as a means of price discrimination. Asking the

162

Where direct evidence of a conspiracy is lacking, circumstantial evidence
tending to exclude the possibility of independent action may be sufficient to
establish the existence of a conspiracy. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939); Theater Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
163
LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 167.
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jury to decide whether this particular form of price discrimination is likely
to increase or decrease output—whether it is efficient or inefficient—is
unlikely to yield a very reliable answer when this very matter is highly
contested among antitrust experts.164
Antitrust rules sometimes turn on economic facts also,165 but standards
almost inevitably do so. This suggests that framing antitrust law as a
standard for cases in which each party has the right to demand a jury trial is
problematic. Not only will the jury be called upon to decide economic facts
outside its competence, but the designation of the law as a standard may
influence the trial judge and court of appeals to afford a greater degree of
deference to the jury’s (often confused) determination. Rules have the
virtue of presenting decisions to jurors in a way that tends to involve
personal facts. Rules also suggest a stronger gate-keeping and sufficiency
of the evidence reviewing role for judges, which minimizes the costs of
adjudicative errors by jurors.
When it comes to public civil enforcement, framing the law as a
standard is more desirable because it signals that greater deference will be
given to the judgments of experts within the antitrust enforcement agencies,
such as administrative law judges and the Commissioners of the Federal
Trade Commission, and to the testimony of economists.166 Privileging the
testimony of economists is problematic in cases likely to be decided by a
jury, since it means deferring to the jury’s uninformed choice between
competing experts. Unfettering economic testimony from strict liability
rules is more desirable in cases decided by antitrust specialists as factfinders or even in bench trials before federal district judges. The risk of
adjudicatory error diminishes, and the advantage of seeking the exact
dividing line between socially beneficial and harmful behavior increases.
164

To get a flavor of the debate, see Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc., No. 04-1329 (S. Ct.), 2005 WL 2427646 Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff,
Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep.
28, 2005); 2005 WL 2427642 Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent (Sep. 28, 2005).
165
In Brooke Group, for example, the jury was called upon to apply the average
variable cost test—a rule. Post-verdict interviews revealed that the jurors found
Brown & Williamson liable for predatory pricing even though the jurors did not
understand the relevant rule. Austin, supra n. xxx at 53-60.
166
In his classic work on administrative discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis argues that
a major function of the FTC should be to frame rules. See Davis, supra n. xxx at
70-74. But there is only a limited advantage to the FTC framing antitrust that will
only apply to FTC actions, since there is no private right of action under the FTC
Act. Rules are most needed to govern private damages actions, not injunctive
actions by the FTC.
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D. Strategic Manipulation and Public Choice Considerations
Antitrust law is susceptible to strategic misuse in two ways. First,
antitrust decision-makers may be subject to capture by regulated
constituencies or others interested in influencing the content of antitrust law
for personal advantage.167 Second, even if the content of antitrust law is
correctly specified from a social welfare perspective, there is a danger that
regulated parties will use antitrust litigation (or the threat of it) to achieve
anticompetitive goals.168 The choice to promulgate law as either rule or
standard can sometimes affect the likelihood that antitrust law will be
strategically misused in either of these ways.
First, consider the likelihood that the creation of antitrust norms will be
unduly influenced—or “captured”—by special interests.169 Most antitrust
law is created by the courts through a common law approach,170 not by
Congress through statutes or the antitrust agencies through promulgation of
administrative regulations.171 The constitutional structure of the federal
judiciary—life tenure, irreduceable salary—is designed to create
independence and objectivity, but there are still opportunities for judicial
capture.172 Amicus curiae briefs by special interests can exert considerable
167

See THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); William
J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition , 28 J. L.
& Econ. 247 (1985).
168
See Edward A. Synder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuses of the Antitrust Laws:
The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551 (1991); Crane, The Paradox of
Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx; R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The
Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, Working Paper, on file with author (2004).
169
Antitrust law creation could also by the subject of another kind of public choice
distortion—cycling or randomness—which may occur when numerous legislators
consider multiple options. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). My focus here is on the specification of antitrust law
by the courts, which entails a much smaller number of decision-makers and smaller
range of decisional options.
170
See supra n. xxx.
171
The agencies do promulgate guidelines concerning their enforcement intentions
which can strongly influence business behavior. This is particularly true in merger
cases where, due to the importance of closing a deal quickly, opposition from the
Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice can mean the death of a deal
whether or not a court would ultimately agree with the agencies’ position.
172
See generally, Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings
L.J. 355 (1999); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991); Lee Epstein, Courts
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influence on a court’s decision.173 Affected constituencies frequently
attempt to shape antitrust decisions through a barrage of amicus curiae
briefs joined by leading corporate sectors (i.e., pharmaceutical companies,
manufacturers, retailers, franchisees), business associations, consumer
groups, or the States. Intellectual or attitudinal capture can also occur. The
Chicago School’s models hypothesizing the efficiency of previously
suspect business practices (such as vertical restraints, tying, price
discrimination, and predatory pricing) may have “captured” the Supreme
Court during the 1970s and 80s, largely because the Chicago School faced
weak intellectual competition.174 This is not “capture” in the usual sense—
Chicago School scholars were not trying to influence the Court’s direction
for personal advantage—but judicial outcomes can become distorted if
judges begin to rely too heavily on any single intellectual current just
because it consistently “wins” the argument against weaker theoretic rivals.
Rules, more than standards, invite collaborative efforts by special
interests to influence the outcome of judicial decisions. When the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals frames antitrust law as a standard, it leaves most
decisions about that particular business practice to case-by-case, post hoc
determination. Industry sectors, labor groups, consumer advocates, or other
special interests have less to gain from seeking to influence any single
litigated case involving a standard, since the next case involving the same
constituencies may be decided differently when all of the relevant factors
are weighed.175 Framing the law as a standard also lessens the chance for
“capture” by any single intellectual school of thought, since the law will be
made in the interstices of litigated cases rather than as a broad conceptual
construct.
By contrast, special interests have more to gain from
and Interest Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335,
349 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
173
Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc'y Rev. 807
(2004); Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000) (reporting that amicus
curiae briefs have an impact on Supreme Court decisions).
174
Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust After the Interception: Of a Heroic Returner and
Myriad Paths, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 287, 291 (2002) (book review). The “PostChicago” school has not exerted as strong an influence on the courts, in part
because it continues to face strong intellectual resistance from the Chicago School.
Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic
Approach, 69 Antitrust L.J. 469, 470 (2001).
175
Framing the law as a standard also minimizes the number of cases on which the
Supreme Court grants certiorari, since it is harder to create circuit splits out of
adjudications under open-ended standards.
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participating when the courts’ resolution will involve framing a rule, since
that rule may predetermine many more future outcomes for those
constituencies. Framing antitrust law as a rule concentrates the stakes for
larger swaths of interests and therefore invites special interests to undertake
concentrated efforts to shape the rule.
These considerations militate in favor of antitrust standards rather than
rules, but the case is different when one considers the strategic
manipulations that can occur in litigation itself. Antitrust law is most
subject to strategic misuse by rent-seeking competitors when it is framed as
an amorphous standard. A growing literature shows that firms can
strategically misuse antitrust to coerce or induce their competitors to forgo
engaging in practice that are efficient but disadvantage the plaintiff.176 For
example, a less efficient firm might threaten a predatory pricing lawsuit
against a more efficient firm to discourage price-cutting, a single-product
firm might threaten a tying lawsuit against a diversified firm to discourage
bundling, a technologically outdated firm might threaten a monopolization
lawsuit against an innovative rival to discourage design innovation, or a
firm making an inferior product might threaten a monopolization lawsuit to
prevent its rival from making disparaging remarks. Such rent-seeking
behavior is more likely to be successful when the governing law is
presented as a standard than as a rule because a standard creates more
adjudicatory uncertainty and risk-averse defendants may desist from an
efficient practice even if it is likely to be vindicated through litigation.
Further, adjudication under a standard tends to prolong litigation and
increase its costs, which increases the chances that the litigation can be used
as a cover to organize tacit collusion between the parties.177
So, again, rules and standards reach a conceptual impasse. Standards
are preferable because they are less likely to cause judicial capture at a
macro level but rules are preferable because they are less likely to
encourage rent-seeking litigation or litigation threats at a micro level.
Neither one of these tendencies is probably strong enough to warrant a
general preference for rules or standards, but some guiding principles can
be drawn. The strategic misuse of antitrust law by competitor plaintiffs is
most likely to be a concern in exclusionary practices cases. Competitors
typically do not have standing to assert antitrust claims in cases involving
collusive but non-exclusionary conduct since the plaintiff usually benefits

176
177
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from such conduct.178 In exclusionary conduct cases, rules are particularly
desirable because they provide rent-seeking competitors with less
opportunity to manipulate the remedial structure of U.S. antitrust law to
achieve anticompetitive gains. Where strategic manipulation is less a
concern, framing antitrust law a standard may lessen the likelihood that the
content of the law will be distorted through interest group pressures.
E. Synthesis of Efficiency Considerations and Decisional Principles
The rules versus standards debate often ends in a stalemate because
there are so many potential variables and it is difficult to know how to
weight them.179 When a court breaks the impasse and chooses a rule or a
standard (or a legal norm that is more rule-like or standard-like), it usually
must do so based on an informed, but imprecise, judgment—what an earlier
generation would have called “wisdom”—about which approach is the
lesser of two evils.180 Both rules and standards have costs. Weighting the
various costs of rules and standards in antitrust is difficult. Perhaps the
most prudent course is to articulate the paradigmatic instances where rules
or standards are preferable and leave the middle grounds ungeneralized.
Rules have the greatest advantage when governing classes of lawsuits
likely to be decided by juries and to result in overdeterrence due to the
uncertainty of standards or strategic abuse in litigation. Especially
troubling is the trend in the lower courts to leave private exclusionary
conduct cases to post hoc, fact-specific determination.181 This commits
ultimate decision-making about economic facts to ill-equipped juries,
threatens to chill vigorous competitive behavior, invites strategic
manipulation by rent-seeking competitors, and increases the costs of
antitrust litigation. Antitrust law can afford to frame underinclusive rules
governing exclusionary behavior in private cases because the high
178

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 (1990) (holding
that competitor lacked antitrust injury and therefore could not challenge vertical
minimum price-fixing scheme since such a scheme would have worked to the
competitor’s advantage)
179
See Diver, supra n. xxx at 70-71, 107 (discussing the difficulties of aggregating
tradeoffs between rules and standards into “an overall evaluation” and noting that
“[c]ourts, as much as politicians, must throw competing values on the scales and
somehow total the score”).
180
Colin Diver refers to this as “an irreducible core of legal controversy about rule
precision that yields only to an indwelling jurisprudential principle of fairness and
propriety.” Diver, supra n. xxx at 107.
181
See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
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likelihood of detection of such behavior combined with the substantial costs
of an adverse judgment will deter most dominant firms from straying too
close to the line drawn by the rule. The same concerns hold, although to a
lesser degree, in private collaborative conduct cases where only consumers
are likely to have standing. The risk of chilling efficient conduct remains,
although the risk of strategic misuse diminishes.
Rules are especially appropriate when used as immunizing devices for
commercial behavior with ambiguous but usually positive social welfare
consequences that could otherwise be challenged under the rule of reason.
The antitrust agencies have encouraged the use of such safe-harbors for
public litigation, for example in announcing that they usually will not
challenge intellectual property licensing agreements where the licensor and
licensee account for less than twenty percent of the relevant market.182
Other potential safe-harbors include market share thresholds for tying,
exclusive dealing, monopolization, and vertical restraints claims, an
absolute “above cost” defense for predatory pricing, primary line price
discrimination, and bundled discounting claims, and per se legality for new
product design. Conduct falling outside these or other safe-harbors would
then be subject to rule of reason treatment.
Few categories of business behavior warrant per se prohibition in rulelike form—perhaps price fixing, bid rigging, patent fraud, and a few others.
But rules can also be used to predetermine individual issues in litigation.
For example, a conclusive presumption that a patent about which a patentee
has brought an infringement lawsuit confers market power may be useful in
simplifying tying litigation,183 even though it does not by itself resolve
whether liability should be imposed. Even where courts believe that
ultimate liability issues should be left to rule of reason balancing, crafting
rules to govern individual issues may reduce the costs of litigation, increase
predictability, and minimize the risk of adjudicatory error and arbitrariness.
Standards are paradigmatically most appropriate to govern public
enforcement seeking prospective relief.184 Such cases pose the least risk of
182

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property § 4.3 (1995), http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
183
See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329 (S. Ct.),
2005 WL 2427642 Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent (Sep. 28, 2005).
184
The distinction I make between public and private enforcement is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s view that the Federal Trade Commission has
prophylactic authority to create antitrust norms beyond those that would obtain
under the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966);
F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953).
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overdeterrence and strategic misuse of antitrust and maximize the benefit of
detailed, case-specific review. To the extent that such cases are heard by
specialized administrative law judges in the Federal Trade Commission,
they also lower the cost of promulgating the applicable legal command,
since the judges can apply at low cost experience from prior cases.
Standards minimize the likelihood of special interest capture of the
enforcement agencies by pushing decision-making down the legal and
administrative hierarchy.
To capture these considerations in a more concrete way, it may be
useful to imagine a set of binary conceptual pairings where one value in
each paring correlates more positively with rules and the other with
standards, as shown in Table A.
Table A
Standard
Public litigation
Prohibitory determinant
Injunction
Idiosyncratic conduct
Collusive conduct

Rule
Private litigation
Immunizing determinant
Damages
Archetypal conduct
Exclusionary conduct

In choosing between rules and standards in antitrust, a court should be
guided by the extent to which these various factors line up or juxtapose in
that particular case. Not all of the factors are of equal weight,185 but at a
minimum they are useful in identifying the paradigmatic cases for applying
rules or standards. Thus, for example, a competitor action seeking damages
for predatory pricing, which is a frequently litigated practice, should be
subjected to immunizing determinants in the form of a rule since this case
lines up all five rule factors (private, immunizing, damages, exclusionary,
archetypal).186 Conversely, in a government action seeking an injunction
against future participation in a potentially collusive agreement of a kind
185

For example, the distinction between collusive and exclusionary conduct is
predicated on the concern that competitors will exploit the indeterminacy of
standards for anticompetitive advantage. In a case brought by the government, this
is unlikely to be a concern. Thus, this conceptual pairing is only relevant in private
actions.
186
This roughly corresponds with the justification for the rule of per se legality for
prices above marginal cost. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing
and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697,
709-10 (1975).
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not often observed, it would be appropriate to create liability under a
standard-based approach since that case would line up all five standard
factors (public, prohibitory, injunctive, collusive, idiosyncratic).187 In cases
where some factors point to standards and others to rules, the court would
need to identify which of the factors was most relevant to its particular case
and assign weight to the different factors based on the circumstances.
IV. NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS
Antitrust may be primarily concerned with economic efficiency, but the
rules versus standards debate comprehends other values and concerns as
well. This final section considers the extent to which reasons other than
efficiency might affect the choice between rules and standards in the
antitrust domain. In particular, it considers the role of both moral and
expressive concerns and concludes that both have some limited importance
to antitrust jurisprudence.
A. Distributive Justice, Personal Autonomy, and Equal Treatment
A significant part the rules versus standards debate has an ideologically
charged flavor. Libertarians like Friedrich Hayek and Richard Epstein have
advocated a rule-based approach to law, believing that ex ante specification
of bright-line liability criteria will minimize the aggrandizement of
governmental authority.188 Conversely, critical legal studies adherents like
Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz have attacked the structure of rules
as entrenching the inequitable status quo and allowing manipulation by the
wealthy and privileged.189
These arguments seem largely off the mark when it comes to antitrust.
While the choice of particular antitrust rules or standards, or the mixture of
the two, may have important implications for the distribution of wealth or
187

This may describe the Polygram case. See supra text accompanying notes xxxxxx.
188
See Epstein, supra n. xxx; FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72
(1944) (advocating approach whereby “government in all its actions is bound by
rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge”); see also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, 205-14
(1960).
189
See Kennedy, supra n. xxx at 1737-51, 1753-56; Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of
Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977).
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the degree of governmental interference with consensual market
transactions, it seems difficult to predict ex ante whether a generally rulebased or standard-based approach will be more interventionist when it
comes to competition policy. The earliest antitrust decisions pitted
interventionist rules against permissive standards.190 When conservative
federal judges used the antitrust laws to suppress the labor movement,
Congress responded with legislative rules categorically immunizing strikes
from the Sherman Act.191 Antitrust opposition to mergers,192 collaborative
restraints of trade, and exclusionary practices reached its zenith under the
Warren Court’s rule-based approach which restricted concentrations of
industrial power and favored non-economic values and small business
interests.193 The movement toward standards was at least in part the work
190

Compare Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S., at 231 (1918) (per
se rule of illegality and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S.
290 (1897) (rule of reason applied in favor of defendants). In fairness, Chicago
Board of Trade could be considered “progressive” insofar as it permitted a practice
that allowed smaller, probably less efficient, rural dealers to participate in the
market. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 44-45 (1978).
191
Congress initially responded to use of antitrust law to enjoin strikes by
providing in the Clayton Act that “[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce” and that labor organizations are not to be “construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws”
and by prohibiting federal courts to enjoin strikes. 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52.
After the Supreme Court continued to sanction injunctions against labor picketing,
see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 330 (1921); Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921), Congress responded with the Norris LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, categorically prohibiting federal injunctions against
peaceful labor activities.
192
In a succession of opinions, the Warren Court rejected merger after merger,
creating the impression that it was following a rule of per se illegality for mergers
causing an increase in market concentration. See Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction
to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. the Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. Rev.
931, 948 (1988) (describing (“Warren Court merger decisions [as] virtual per se
holdings.”).
193
A classic statement of the Warren Court’s small-business preference appears in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries
and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization.”). For a generally positive account of the Warren Court’s
approach to antitrust, see Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 917, 919, 922-23 (1987).

49

CRANE

3/5/2006 2:56 PM

of the Chicago School’s laissez-faire project in the 1970s and 1980s. While
some of the recent exclusionary practices cases have rejected rules that
would have immunized defendants in favor of open-ended standards more
likely to result in a plaintiff’s verdict, the history of antitrust jurisprudence
generally suggests the opposite tendency than that suggested by Duncan
and Horwitz:
rules have often been more favorable to antitrust
interventions in market conduct and standards more favorable to business
interests.194
It is also hard to make the case that rules systematically favor powerful
industrial interests that understand the rules and their loopholes and best
know how to, and can afford to, manipulate the system. Antitrust law is
often enforced publicly by expert, motivated, and relatively well-financed
staff at the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission. Even on
the private side, the treble damages remedy,195 unilateral fee-shifting in
favor of plaintiffs,196 and the magnitude of recoverable damages (often in
the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars) has created a
competent, motivated, and well-financed plaintiffs’ bar. In cases of
exclusionary conduct, the injured party is liable to be a corporation and not
a poorly educated individual. Even where the harm is distributed across a
wide number of consumers, the class action mechanism—which is often
favored in antitrust cases involving uniform conduct by the defendants
affecting prices to a large number of consumers197—allows aggregation of
claims in a way that levels the playing field.
Of course, it is possible to view the entire antitrust project as a farce
designed to conceal the deep inequities of capitalism.198 But if that is the
194

This is not to say that, going forward, there is any particular reason to believe
that rules will be applied in a more interventionist way than standards.
195
15 U.S.C. § 15.
196
Id.
197
Federal judges are fond of reporting that class certification is favored in antitrust
cases. See, e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 232 F.R.D. 346, 350
(N.D. Cal. 2005); Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 269 F.Supp.2d
159, 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Industrial Diamonds Antitrust Litigation, 167
F.R.D. 374, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
198
See, e.g., William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law 18871890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (1955) (reporting that some observers
maintained that Sherman Act was a fraud because Congress was dominated by
“many of the . . . industrial magnates most vulnerable to real antitrust legislation”)
(quoting M. FAINSOD & L. GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
450 (1941)). Senator Sherman, the Act’s sponsor, admonished that Congress
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and
the nihilist,” 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890), suggesting that the goal of the Sherman
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case, the choice between rules and standards does not matter much and the
conversation needs to be about deeper questions of resource allocation,
property ownership, labor rights, industrial policy, and law as a means of
social control. Antitrust—whether based on rules or standards—assumes
the normativity of free enterprise, industrial competition, and demand-based
allocation of social resources. Within those parameters, rules are not
generally more oppressive to the disadvantaged than standards.
On the other side of the aisle, libertarian Richard Epstein advocates
“simple rules for a complex world” in order to curb the power of the
state.199 When it comes to antitrust, Epstein envisions a set of narrow
rules—perhaps a common-law refusal to enforce price-fixing agreements
and little more.200 Epstein envisions not simpler antitrust but virtually no
antitrust. The argument for minimalist antitrust policy does not have that
much to do with whether antitrust policy should be formulated as rules or
standards if it is broadly formulated.
As we have seen, in the antitrust
realm it is possible for rules to be either interventionist or laissez-faire
(compare the Colgate and Dr. Miles rules).201 If antitrust law is going to
address business practices like vertical restraints of trade, predatory pricing,
or horizontal collusion, it is not clear ex ante that rules will be less
interventionist than standards.
Eric Posner argues that rules are to be favored “if we care about
autonomy, because standards, more than rules, encourage self-reinforced
conformity to the imagined goals of the state rather than actions that reflect
one’s authentic values and interests.”202 It is not clear to what extent this
argument has force as applied to antitrust law, which generally applies to
large corporate actors rather than individuals. The “authentic values and
interests” of corporations are generally profit maximization for the benefit
of shareholders,203 and it is hard to state categorically ex ante whether rules
or standards are more likely to maximize shareholder profits.

Act was to appease the public rather than to achieve significant wealth
redistribution.
199
Epstein, supra n. xxx.
200
Id. at 123-27; see also Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level
Playing Field: The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49 (2005).
201
See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
202
Eric Posner, supra n. xxx at 117.
203
Indeed, managers and boards of directors are ordinarily assumed to have a
fiduciary obligation to pursue these goals single-mindedly. But see Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005)
(arguing that corporate law gives managers the discretion to sacrifice shareholder
profits in favor of the public interest).
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Another political-moral concern that often arises in the rules versus
standards debate concerns equality. Rules tend to create formal equality by
eliminating arbitrariness and inconsistency in adjudication, but the bright
lines drawn by rules sometimes create substantive inequality by lumping
together people who are not similarly situated.204 On the other hand,
standards can conceal arbitrariness in decision-making because it is always
possible to point to some ostensibly relevant factor differentiating two
otherwise similar cases.205 It has been a long time since anyone has thought
about antitrust in explicitly moral terms,206 but whatever the content of
antitrust, courts must make some effort to apply it evenly. The risk of
arbitrary and inconsistent results in a standard-based system increases with
the complexity of the law administered and the unsophistication of the
ultimate decision-maker. Much of antitrust law is highly complex, and
juries—which are more likely to be entrusted with decisions under
standards than under rules207—are often in over their heads in economically
complicated antitrust cases. These factors create the conditions for
adjudicatory arbitrariness. In Section III(C), I discussed the allocation of
decision-making responsibilities that comes with the choice of rules or
standards further, suggesting that standards tend to push more ultimate
decision-making onto jurors. If we are concerned about disparate treatment
of similarly situated parties, there is something to be said for maintaining
antitrust rules.
B. Maintaining the Expressive Core
In thinking about the optimal specification of legal commands, it is
important to keep in mind how the legal commands will communicate the
204

See Sullivan, supra n. xxx at 62; Davis, supra n. xxx at v (arguing that “the
greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where
rules and principles provide no or little guidance, where emotions of deciding
officers may affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may influence
decisions, and where the imperfections of human nature are often rejected in the
choices made).
205
Posner, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra n. xxx at 44.
206
No less an authority than Herbert Hovenkamp informs us that “antitrust has no
moral content.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28
J. Corp. L. 607, 609 (2003); but see Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the
Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 86-87 (1999) (describing turn-of-the-century
view that prices at a competitive level were part of a “natural” order and that
deviations from that price through monopolistic or collusive conduct were a moral
wrong).
207
See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
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core values of the relevant legal enterprise both to regulated entities and the
general public. As Thurman Arnold wrote a few years before transforming
the Antitrust Division into a modern, aggressive agency, law plays an
important role in expressing contradictory social values.208 Nowhere is this
more evident than in a case like Socony, which Arnold pressed on behalf of
the United States. The “dancing partner” arrangement among the
Midwestern oil refiners challenged by the Government had been instigated
by the Administrator of the Petroleum Administration Board that was
created by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to a federal statute and an
executive order of President Roosevelt.209 After the Supreme Court
invalidated key portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act,210 the
Department of Justice turned on the dancing partner program as a price fix.
The shift from federal instigation to federal condemnation happened in
heartbeat and it was left to the federal courts to work out the contradiction.
Justice Douglas found that solution in the enunciation of a sweeping per se
prohibition on price fixing, a decree so strong that the reasonableness of the
defendants’ conduct in light of the regulatory apparatus of a few weeks
earlier was utterly irrelevant.211
Although antitrust practioners have come to think of antitrust as a
generally bureaucratic discipline at the public enforcement level and a
complex field for expert lawyers and economists at the private enforcement
level, antitrust will always symbolize to the public at large certain values of
capitalism and its restraints.212 Even if most lawyers, judges, or business
people do not think of antitrust in moral terms,213 the enforcement agencies
go out of their way to depict core antitrust violations as malum in se. In
press releases, the Attorney General solemnly informs the public that price
fixing “robs American consumers of the benefit of competitive prices,”214
208

THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
310 U.S. at 171-74.
210
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corporation v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
211
310 U.S. at 221-222. Justice Douglas dismissed the governmentally mandated
origins of the distress gasoline program, saying: “Though employees of the
government may have known of those programs and winked at them or tacitly
approved them, no immunity would have thereby been obtained.” Id. at 226.
212
As Bob Pitofsky reminds us, antitrust has always had, and will always have, a
political content. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1051 (1979).
213
See supra n. xxx.
214
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to
Pay $300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13.
2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/212002.htm.
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just as surely as if the price-fixers had walked into a bank with a drawn gun.
If price fixing is to be analogized (when convenient) to robbery, it will do
no good to explain that this is only true at the end of the collaborative
restraints of trade continuum where the defendant has failed to rebut a
prima facie assumption that the conduct in question causes social welfare
losses. Price fixing is only “robbery” if price fixing is prohibited—period.
Simply articulated rules about what is categorically permitted are also
necessary to express the competition preference of capitalism. Rules are
needed as bookends to the range of possible legal outcomes. If price fixing
is categorically prohibited, then perhaps refusing to collaborate with
competitors should be categorically allowed.215 This allows antitrust to be
reduced to a maxim like “competition, not collusion” which expresses the
heart of the enterprise to the laity even if antitrust insiders experience the
rules as somewhat fuzzier.
Antitrust law needs to maintain a rule-expressed core not only for the
general public but also for the constituencies whose behavior it regulates.
Business schools seem to teach very little about antitrust.216 Larry White
reports that nine leading business school microeconomics textbooks
devoted a total of 64 pages out of 6,421 to antitrust principles.217 Business
people frequently profess surprise—real or feigned—when told that their
conduct violated the antitrust laws.218 If all of antitrust breaks down into
amorphous standards, it will be even easier for business schools to shunt all
of antitrust off to the lawyers.
In order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust law, the Supreme
Court should take care to ensure that, even in a generally standard-based
system, at least a few principles of antitrust law remain enunciated as blackletter rules. One could imagine a canon of antitrust rules along the
following lines: (1) If you fix prices with your competitor, you will go to
215

In Trinko, the Supreme Court came close to ruling that firms never have an
obligation to cooperate with their competitors, although it avoided overruling
Aspen Skiing which did recognize such an obligation in the facts of that case. See
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
408-10 (2004).
216
See Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47
N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 67, 73 (2003); Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics in MBA
Programs: What’s Thought, What’s Taught, 47 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 87, 91-95 (2003).
217
White, supra n. xxx at 94-95.
218
Even in a hard-core price-fixing case like the Christie’s/Sotheby’s agreements
on seller’s commissions, some of the high-ranking executives involved expressed
surprise that their conduct was illegal. See CHRISTOPHER MASON, ART OF THE
STEAL (2004). One does not have to believe their protestations to appreciate the
value of clearly delineated rules in removing the excuse.
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jail; (2) Do not divide markets with your competitors—you must compete!;
(3) You have no obligation to cooperate with your competitors; (4) You
may set your price as high or as low as you please, but not below your cost;
(5) If your market share exceeds 70%, you are a monopolist—watch
yourself! These or other similar principles could be enunciated as simple
rules, thus maintaining the expressive core of antitrust, even if practitioners
realize that the rules are not as determinate as they appear on paper.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, antitrust’s transition from a categorical ex ante approach
to a more open-ended, multi-factor, and post-hoc approach resembles the
development of Anglo-American common law. The system started with a
number of relatively narrow and formalistic rules (compare the per se rules
to the common law writs); eventually the needs of the relevant constituency
outgrew the boundaries of the rules; the courts essentially froze the rules
and refused to create new categories; new modes of adjudication were
required and found their place in a flexible system of “equity;” equity and
law competed for some time until the flexibility of equity overcame the
rigidity of law; eventually law and equity collapsed into a single system,
with the spirit of equity predominating.219 To a large extent, this narrative
describes where we have been, and where we appear to be headed, in
antitrust adjudication.
It is easy to recount a rules-to-standards story as a saga of progress,
and there is much to be said in favor of antitrust law’s transition toward
standards, particularly because there was much to be said against many of
the old rules. But the deficiencies of the old rules should not mislead us to
believe that antitrust standards are always superior to antitrust rules or that a
system of flexible standards can be maintained without a core of bright-line
rules. As noted at the outset, the legal pendulum usually swings back and
forth between rules and standards as the disadvantages of the prevailing
regime lead to calls for reform. The best way to prevent such cycles and
maintain long-term flexibility where it most matters is to preserve a rulebased structure for significant portions of the antitrust endeavor.
In deciding between rules and standards, it is critical to keep in mind
the remedial and legal-cultural settings in which antitrust law intersects
with litigants and prospective litigants. The trend toward open-ended rule
of reason analysis makes good sense when applied to the Federal Trade
219

See generally Davis, supra n. xxx at 19; FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND,
EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1910).
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Commission or Department of Justice when they seek to alter future
behavior. It makes less sense when applied to treble damages actions by
rent-seeking private litigants, which raises the danger of overdeterrence and
strategic misuse of the unpredictability created by multi-factored standards.
There is still an important place in antitrust jurisprudence for defensive
safe-harbors formed by bright-line rules. And, in order to maintain the
expressive core of antitrust, a few per se prohibitions and per se rules of
legality should be maintained.
Justice Marshall was wrong to view economic analysis of industrial
practices as an untamable wild, but he was right to recognize the
advantages of rules. We do not have to return to Topco’s rigidity to
preserve a space for dynamic rules in antitrust adjudication.
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